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Figure 1, SMS illustrated, and some of the pillars supporting it. 
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ABSTRACT; EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
European aviation has evolved from deeply regulated and state funded airlines to open skies, 
fierce competition, and despite EU regulation, rule shopping among airlines. The introduction 
of low cost carriers sparked a transition from typical towards atypical employment models for 
pilots, through self-employment and work agencies. The large survey performed by Ghent 
University described this and concerns towards safety (Jorens et al., 2015). Another survey 
released in November 2016 performed by London School of Economics focused on safety 
culture among European pilots and despite overall good results, disclosed safety concerns 
towards areas such as Just Culture & Reporting, Perceived Safety Support and Fatigue 
(Reader et al., 2016). Both surveys concluded with large in-group pilot differences.  
EU through EASA has adopted the ICAO initiative to establish a Safety Management System 
at all levels and this system needs inputs to promote a safety culture throughout the 
organization (EASA, 2014, ICAO, 2013). Reporting, Just culture, Fatigue reporting and 
Safety Support are some of the vital areas required to have an efficient Safety Management 
System. 
This study combines the findings in the two surveys, employment models and concerning 
safety culture areas, with the assumption that this will affect European flight safety work and 
the ability of SMS to stay effective in this respect. -But limit the population to a subset of the 
mentioned surveys; -Commercial pilots flying for Nordic operators, abroad or in the Nordic 
countries.   
Research Question 
How does the changing pilot employment environment affect Safety Management System 
effectiveness? 
Method 
An extensive quantitative survey, snowball sampling, were used to collect data. Analysis were 
performed on the four mention safety culture areas and in-group differences were also 
analyzed, mainly age, management role, contract type, previous contract and company type.  
Results 
Overall the results within the safety areas described verified the good mean scores except for 
the fatigue dimension, all in line with the LSE survey. The area of fatigue showed concerning 
results and calls for immediate attention. In-group differences showed cracks in the SMS 
fundament particularly within these groups: 
iii 
 Company types, Low Cost Carrier’s scores considerably more negative than Legacy 
Carriers and Helicopter versus safety areas analyzed. 
 Employment contracts versus safety dimensions studied, favor typically over atypical 
employment contracts. 
 Younger and less experienced pilots are more negative, or if you like; -the future of 
European aviation, is less positive towards the safety culture evolution seen in Europe 
today. 
These findings should call for attention and further studies, but do not render the SMS totally 
ineffective per se. 
Other findings showed a huge mistrust among all pilots towards the ability for regulators to 
regulate; political governance of the regulators was listed 20 times more often than terrorist 
acts as the greatest threat to European aviation, and the areas of employment models and 
fatigue respectively 50 and 45 times more often, -both areas greatly influenced and controlled 
by the regulators. Information and reporting at the state level showed miserable results (46 % 
of the pilots don’t know if there is a reporting system at the state level). If these results are 
verified in future studies this show a failure by EU, EASA and national CAA, to implement a 
SSP with efficient SMS throughout European aviation, i.e. reporting inputs and/or 
information output to their SMS fails. 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that the overall results show a good safety culture there are areas of great 
concern, especially employment models and fatigue. The revealed mistrust towards 
CAA/EASA, and the political influence, is aggregating this picture since the regulators are 
setting the playground in these areas. These findings will probably limit the ability for the 
SMS stay effective in the changing world of European aviation. The area of fatigue calls for 
immediate action, and the mistrust towards regulators ability to regulate calls for larger 
studies. 
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SAMMENDRAG 
Introduksjon 
Europeisk luftfart har utviklet seg fra et statsregulert og statsdrevet system mot et åpent og 
svært konkurranseutsatt system. Til tross for diverse EU-regulativ er det mulig for flyselskap 
å «shoppe» regler i de forskjellige EU land. Introduksjonen av lavprisselskap (LCC) og deres 
jakt på kostnadskutt medførte en vridning av ansettelsesforhold for piloter i Europa. Fra 
typiske (direkte ansatt) til atypiske kontrakter gjennom bemanningsbyråer og eller tredje-, 
fjerdepart osv. En stor undersøkelse fra universitetet i Gent beskrev disse 
ansettelsesforholdene og uttrykte bekymring i forhold til sikkerhetsaspekter (Jorens et al., 
2015). I en fersk undersøkelse fra London School of Economics med fokus på Europeiske 
piloter og sikkerhetskultur ble det også avdekket bekymringsverdige forhold, selv om det 
totale bildet var godt. Bekymringene gikk hovedsakelig på arbeidsbelastning, tillitskultur, 
rapporteringsvillighet og opplevd støtte i sikkerhetsspørsmål.(Reader et al., 2016). Begge 
undersøkelser viste riktignok store forskjeller innad i pilotgruppen. 
Gjennom EU direktiv har EASA adoptert ICAO sitt initiativ om å etablere et «Safety 
Management System» (SMS) på alle nivåer. EASA, nasjonale luftfartsmyndigheter og det 
enkelte selskap har alle en plikt til dette. ICAO peker på rapporteringsvillighet, herunder 
arbeidsbelastningsforhold, tillittskultur og støtte samt informasjon i sikkerhetsspørsmål som 
suksesskriterier for et effektivt SMS (ICAO, 2013). 
Denne studien kombinerer de nevnte undersøkelser, ansettelsesforhold og sikkerhetskultur, i 
et forsøk på å se om Europeisk flysikkerhetsarbeid (SMS) kan opprettholde sin effektivitet i et 
endret arbeidsmiljø for piloter. Undersøkelsen begrenser seg til piloter som arbeider for 
Nordiske selskap, men det vil også si piloter basert utenfor Norden, men som opererer fra 
utenlandske baser for Nordiske selskap. 
Problemstilling 
Hvordan påvirker piloters endrede ansettelsesforhold effektiviteten i «Safety Management» 
Systemene?  
Metode 
Metoden som ble valgt for å samle inn data var en ekstensiv kvantitativ spørreundersøkelse, 
etter snøballprinsippet. Statistiske analyser ble utført på de nevnte sikkerhetskulturforhold, 
samt forskjeller innad i pilotgruppen. Analyser innad i gruppen begrenset seg hovedsakelig til 
forskjeller mellom unge og eldre, typisk og atypisk ansatte, piloter med og uten ledelsesrolle, 
v 
forrige ansettelseskontrakt (typiske og atypiske) og til slutt type av selskap(Nettverk, LCC, 
Helikopter).  
Resultater 
Resultatene for de fire sikkerhetskulturgruppene var totalt sett gode og i tråd med eller bedre 
enn LSE undersøkelsen. Kun forhold som omhandlet arbeidsbelastning var i området som gir 
rom for tolkning og til dels så bekymringsfullt at dette krever fokus umiddelbart. Ser vi på 
forskjeller innad i pilotgruppen er det flere grunner til bekymring, og mye taler for at det er 
sprekker i pilarene som kreves for et effektivt SMS, spesielt fant undersøkelsen store 
forskjeller innad i disse gruppene: 
 Type av selskap, LCC er betydelig mer negative enn Nettverks og Helikopter piloter i 
alle fire sikkerhetskultur dimensjoner. 
 Typisk ansatte piloter er mer positive enn atypisk ansatte i forhold til 
sikkerhetskulturdimensjonene. 
 Yngre og mindre erfarne piloter er mer negative enn eldre og mer erfarne til 
sikkerhetskulturutviklingen i Europa. Det er et paradoks da de fleste i den yngre 
gruppen har følt dette «nye Europa» på kroppen, mens den eldre garde ikke har 
opplevd dette regimet i samme grad, da de i stor grad fortsatt besitter typiske 
ansettelsesforhold. 
Disse funnene krever videre studier/validering og videre oppfølging av myndighetene. Det er 
ikke på dette grunnlaget grunn til å si at Safety Management Systemet per se er ineffektivt, 
men muligens mindre effektivt enn nødvendig på grunn av arbeidsforhold og 
arbeidsbelastning blant piloter. 
Andre funn som tydeliggjør bildet av et brutt tillitsforhold mellom piloter, selskap og 
regulerende myndigheter er den politiske styringen av luftfartsmyndighetene i Europa og de 
enkelte land. Politisk styring av regulerende myndigheter ble angitt 20 ganger oftere enn 
terroristhandlinger som den største sikkerhetsfaren mot Europeisk luftfart. Ansettelsesforhold 
og arbeidsbelastning ble angitt henholdsvis 50 og 45 ganger så ofte som terrorhandlinger, 
begge disse områdene er styrt av regulerende myndigheter. 
Informasjon og rapportering på myndighetsnivå viste miserable resultater (46,5 % av 
kommersielle piloter anga at de ikke viste at det var et nasjonalt rapporteringssystem (ikke 
foretaksnivå, men nasjonalt rapporteringsnivå)). Hvis dette i fremtiden viser seg å være riktig 
har EU/EASA/CAA mislyktes i å implementere et State Safety Program og et effektivt SMS 
på dette nivået, og det må derfor stilles spørsmåltegn ved effektiviteten til myndighetene i 
sikkerhetsspørsmål som informasjon og rapportering. 
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Konklusjon 
Til tross for det gode totalbildet av sikkerhetskulturarbeidet er det grunnlag for bekymring når 
det kommer til områdene som styrer arbeidsbelastning og ansettelsesforhold, og spesielt i 
samhandling med muligheten til å opprettholde et effektivt Safety Management System er det 
grunn til bekymring. Mistilliten mot styrende myndigheter og deres evne til å regulere de 
nevnte forhold, samt politisk innflytelse på dette arbeidet, forverrer bildet.  
Funnene i denne undersøkelsen viser at det er sannsynlig at Safety Management Systemet er 
under press og mindre effektivt enn nødvendig.  
Arbeidsbelastning er et område som påberoper seg umiddelbar handling fra myndighetene og 
mistilliten blant piloter mot regulerende myndigheter krever videre studier. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The European aviation business has dramatically changed in the past two decades. The branch 
evolved from national “sponsored” network carriers to open skies and low cost carriers, LCC. 
The rough competition and huge cost focus made large changes in employment models 
among pilots. The survey conducted at Ghent University revealed a number of typical (direct 
employment) and atypical employment models, the latter category ranged from “open ended 
contracts through work agencies” to “fixed-term work via (temporary) work agencies” and 
“bogus self-employment” (Jorens et al., 2015). 
Eurocontrol and the European Commission launched, through London School of Economics, 
LSE, a survey focusing on safety culture among European pilot groups. The survey was 
released in late November 2016. It revealed considerable differences between typically and 
atypically employed pilots in Europe, especially the safety culture dimensions of “perceived 
safety support”, “fatigue” and “just culture and reporting” raised concern (Reader et al., 
2016, p. 24).  
The evolution in aviation safety has gone from the technical era, through the human factors 
era and now into the organizational era (EASA also name a fourth era; the system era, ICAO 
embeds this into the organizational era) (EASA, 2014, ICAO, 2013). Safety culture is a main 
objective and target in the safety work launched through ICAO Annex 19 regulations. 
The four factors pointed out above, restructure and fierce competition, new employment 
models for pilots and cabin crew, safety culture and the organizational focus introduced in the 
safety work are all factors joined in the Safety Management Systems now being implemented 
in Europe.  Even though many companies have worked along this path for a long time, it is 
few studies on how this system enhances safety, and even less studies on the management 
views and actions than on the pilot views, or in other words “the blunt end” versus “the sharp 
end” (Hollnagel, 2014), and none were found addressing the SMS effectiveness versus the 
sharp end and the changing ball game of employment. 
The safety management system (SMS), as described in chapter 4 of ICAO annex 19 and used 
as a roadmap for European implementation, is supported by four safety pillars: 
 Safety Policy.  
 Safety Assurance. 
 Safety Risk Management. 
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 This in turn directs Safety Promotion.  
The system has some vital inputs, such as audits, electronic analysis, investigation of 
incidents and reporting (ICAO, 2013, EU, 2014). All of them involving human actions, even 
the electronic analysis are filtered through humans, or in other words dependent on a safety 
culture throughout the organization and authorities. The political establishment are off course 
a vital force when setting the agenda and hence deeply responsible for the resulting safety 
culture. 
1.2 The Research Question, -main objective of the study 
How does the changing pilot employment environment  
affect Safety Management System effectiveness? 
-A Nordic pilot perspective on safety culture pillars of European aviation. 
1.2.1 Other objectives of the study 
1. To validate LSE findings versus the four safety dimensions and the Nordic pilot 
group as a whole, and to look at in-group differences. 
a. Just Culture 
b. Reporting 
c. Perceived safety support. 
d. Fatigue 
2. Respondents knowledge of own company and the company’s focus areas: 
a. SMS 
b. Reporting systems 
c. Safety focus objectives 
3. The Nordic pilot group view, and in-group differences, on typical and atypical 
employment versus  
a. Flight safety. 
b. Safety reporting and fatigue reports. 
c. Treats to European aviation. 
4. Does the Nordic pilot group have information and knowledge of national authorities 
reporting systems?  -and in-group differences. 
5. Does the Nordic pilot group have confidence in EASA/CAA as a regulators and 
supervisory organization?  -and in-group differences. 
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1.3 The Aviation Safety Evolution, historical background information 
Newton assumption that every action has a reaction, one action leads to the other, is the basis 
of safety work in the western world. In other words, every incident may be explained by the 
chain of events, broken down to the smallest item, word, technical part and so on. 
Analytically breaking down the accident in clear logical sequences is the normal way to deal 
with safety issues especially in the west, i.e. to pin point and categorize the reason for the 
accident (Dekker, 2014). The tendencies for us humans to grab a single easy understandable 
reason, especially when it fits our inner view, are pronounced. Media, authorities, business 
leaders and investigators all have a tendency to seek the single reason, the blamable person, 
the root cause or the bad apple, and all safety reports are categorized into reasons for the 
incident or accident (Ibid).  
Herbert William Heinrich’s empirical study of 1931 is still the basis of many branches view 
on safety, modernized or not. The study showed a relationship between the number of 
accidents that causes a major injury and incidents not causing any harm. He advocated that for 
every accident that causes major injury there was 29 accidents with minor injuries and 300 
accidents with no injuries. Many of the accidents had the same root cause and by focusing on 
those we could improve safety, the statistics would be much better (Heinrich, 1931).  This 
view is still alive in major sectors like the Norwegian health sector. They have urinary tract 
infection as a main target. Reducing this number will by far improve the statistics the most 
(Helsedirektoratet, 2016), but does it enhance patient safety on an organizational level? 
Many branches, like aviation, have recognized that our socio-technological organization with 
a complex interaction between systems and humans, and an extremely dynamic organizational 
structure are far more complex to predict and especially to pin point the main reason for a 
mishap (Dekker, 2014, p 27). Despite this the aviation authorities and the airlines still 
categorize incidents in their statistics (Skybrary, 2016, EASA, 2015). In contradiction to the 
statistics the investigator incidents reports rarely point to one single cause and often point to 
underlying latent errors, organizational, training flaws etc. in their reports.  
1.3.1 Overall European aviation safety statistics (2014), the long term trend 
What about the overall long term trend?  
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Figure 2, EASA Member States, Airplane accident rate 
The yellow line depict the number of accidents in EU with fatal outcome per 10 000 000 
movements, one in 2014. The blue line show the accident rate without fatal outcome, forty in 
2014 (EASA, 2015). The numbers are for fixed wing aircraft excluding helicopters. 
In the figure below the ICAO illustration on the long term accident trend is shown. The 
numbers are from ICAO member states as given by the Airplane manufacturer Airbus 
(Airbus, 2014). Only commercial operated flights and fatal accidents are shown. 
 
Figure 3, Historical accident rate with fatal outcome (Airbus, 2014) 
All the numbers are quite impressive and often used as a reference in other branches 
(Townsend, 2013), and we will let the numbers speak for them self. 
1.3.2 The aviation safety eras 
The European aviation safety management system are based on ICAO recommendation, 
annex 19 of the Chicago Convention; -especially chapter 4 of annex 19 (Commission, 2015).  
5 
 
The ICAO Safety Management Manual, SMM, is the practical guide to implementation of 
SMS, both at the state and operator level.  
SMM chapter 2 describes the evolution of aviation safety. The manual describes three eras of 
evolution, the technical, the human factors and the organizational era. In short, and with 
ICAO’s words: 
 “Technical era, from early 1900s until late 1960s.” ….”The focus of safety 
endeavors was therefore placed on the investigation and improvement of 
technical factors. By the 1950s, technological improvements led to a gradual 
decline in the frequency of accidents, and safety processes were broadened to 
encompass regulatory compliance and oversight.” 
 “The human factors era, from the early 1970s until the mid-1990s: ….the focus 
of safety endeavors was extended to include human factors issues including the 
man/machine interface” …. “The application of human factors science tended 
to focus on the individual, without fully considering the operational and 
organizational context. It was not until the early 1990s that it was first 
acknowledged that individuals operate in a complex environment, which 
includes multiple factors having the potential to affect behavior.” 
 “The organizational era, from the mid-1990s to the present day. During the 
organizational era safety began to be viewed from a systemic perspective, 
which was to encompass organizational factors in addition to human and 
technical factors.” … “This new approach is based on routine collection and 
analysis of data using proactive as well as reactive methodologies to monitor 
known safety risks and detect emerging safety issues. These enhancements 
formulated the rationale for moving towards a safety management approach.” 
(ICAO, 2013, p 2-1) 
6 
 
 
Figure 4, The evolution of the safety culture focus areas (ICAO, 2013) 
 
Figure 5, EASA view on the safety culture area evolution (EASA, 2014) 
The EASA illustration, above, illustrate a fourth era “the system safety era”. ICAO considers 
this a part of the “organizational era”, so the difference is marginal.  
The big question is; -do the statistics show the real safety trend or just a false impression of 
almost absolute safety? Is the absence of fatal accidents a proof of safety?  Some researchers 
have addressed this issue and found the lack of studies on why things go right. The reverse 
logic of saying no accidents is the same as safety is false, the reasons for success are what we 
should dig into (Dekker, 2012b, 2013b, 2013a, 2014, Hollnagel, 2012, 2014, Townsend, 
2013).The world is getting more and more complex and interrelated, it is hard to oversee how 
one component will influence another, and if a failure occurs or an “absolute correct” input is 
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wrong the complexity makes it almost impossible to predict the outcome (Dekker, 2013b, 
Hollnagel, 2014, Townsend, 2013).  
The implementation of the State Safety Plan (SSP) and hence the operators mandatory Safety 
Management System (SMS), together with the definition of the organizational era, in safety 
work show that the problem is recognized by the authorities, .i.e. EASA and most European 
national Civil Aviation Authorities. 
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2 Literature review and theoretical background  
2.1 Safety Management System; -Safety culture 
The organizational era, or in the EASA case the “System safety era”, may also be classified as 
a management era, where building a safety culture is one of the main objectives on all levels, 
from EASA/EU, state authorities, AOC holders and to the sharp end.  
“The ultimate responsibility for the establishment and adherence to sound safety 
practices rests with the management of the organization. A safety culture cannot be 
effective unless it is embedded within an organization’s own culture.” 
(ICAO, 2013, p 2-10) 
FAA has made this illustration of the key components of the Safety Management system: 
 
Figure 6, FAA; the four main SMS components (FAA, 2016b) 
The interaction of policy, Safety Risk Management and Safety Assurance leads to safety 
promotion and a safety culture in that organization, all four components are tightly interlaced. 
The model can be applied at all organizational levels; EU directives/regulations lead to EASA 
EASp, CAA SSP/SMS and the operators SMS. This is briefly described below. 
EASA has lounched a program called European Aviation Safety Plan (EASp), a plan to 
produce an EU equivalent of the ICAO State Safety Plan, SSP, where the SMS is a vital part. 
The EASp goal is to promote a more efficient means of discharging the obligation and would 
support the EU Member and associated States in developing their own SSP’s (EU, 2014). 
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Figure 7, An operators SMS flow chart (Classroom lecture at Nord University) 
The model show two main inputs to a safety management system, the safety reporting system 
and risk exposure evaluation process. In this paper the safety reporting will be given the most 
focus. 
2.1.1 The difference between “Active” and “Latent” errors; -the reason for SMS 
The ICAO (2013) Safety Management Manual SMM, recognize active and latent errors, 
where active are more obvious faults/errors conducted by for instance the crew. The reason 
might be complex, but often pinpointed to one error that evolved into an incident, and a 
potential threat to aviation safety (Dekker, 2013a).  
Active errors are errors or procedural violations performed at the workplace, person and team 
errors or direct technical breakdown (Edkins, 1998). These errors are classically illustrated 
with the Swiss cheese models  where the errors only have adverse effect if the holes align and 
the error is not caught by a “slice” of defense, the original model and the current did consider 
latent errors too (Reason et al., 2006): 
 
Figure 8, Reasons, current version 1997 Swiss Cheese Model (Reason et al., 2006, p. 10) 
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The latent errors are what the SMS and the organizational era try to address, of course 
together with the classic errors like technical and human factor errors etc. These latent errors 
are embedded in the organization, the authorities, AOC holders, manufactures, maintenance, 
manuals, training and procedures, crew motivation and the fear the crew might feel (towards a 
new contract etc.) or of course a combination of these (ICAO, 2013). The challenge increases 
when risk assessment involves the future and how a change will influence a complex system 
such as Aviation (Masson and Morier, 2012), or like Professor Dekker puts it; Aviation is 
considered a complex environment, and hence difficult to predict what will happen if 
something are changed, introduced or removed (Dekker, 2012b).  
“Complexity is an attribute of systems or items which makes their operation difficult 
to comprehend.  Increased system complexity is often caused by such items as 
sophisticated components and multiple interrelationships.” (Masson and Morier, 
2012, p. 19) 
Summed up; Edkins (1998) illustration of the latent error pathway/bypass as adopted from 
Reason (1995) may illustrate the difference in latent and active errors: 
 
Figure 9, Latent errors bypass scenario, adopted from Reason (1995) by Edkins (1998) 
2.1.2 Methods used to detect future risk, and the European SSP 
Reactive and proactive methodologies are used to detect and analyze safety issues, both 
known and emerging issues (ICAO, 2013). The reactive consist of electronic analysis, 
investigations, reports and statistics. The proactive seeks actively hazardous conditions in an 
organization through audits, reports and methodology to predict future risks. In both the 
reactive and proactive system safety reports play an integrated role (FAA, 2016b). 
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Figure 10, FAA reactive and proactive SMS processes. (FAA, 2016a) 
The EU EASp initiative has the same main goals, the possibility to be proactive and to assess 
future risks; the SSP and SMS systems are explicit on the importance of a proactive system in 
addition to the reactive: 
“(5) Experience has shown that accidents are often preceded by safety-related 
incidents and deficiencies revealing the existence of safety hazards. Safety information 
is therefore an important resource for the detection of potential safety hazards. In 
addition, whilst the ability to learn from an accident is crucial, purely reactive systems 
have been found to be of limited use in continuing to bring forward improvements…”. 
(EU, 2014, Section 5) 
The EASp includes numerous projects, one of the notable projects is the FAST (Future 
Aviation Safety Team) which has put forward a methodology for assessing future risk, but it 
also recognizes “the learning organization”. 
“A major characteristic of a learning organisation is that it requires a pro-active, 
organisation-wide, integrated approach so that all of the human, organisational, 
industry and environmental considerations associated with future safety are managed 
in a wellcoordinated way.”  (Masson and Morier, 2012, p. 17) 
“Without an organisation-wide sharing of safety system information, the true scope of 
future changes, hazards, their impacts and likelihoods, and the controls and 
mitigations put in place to manage them may not be available for key stages of the 
augmented safety assessment process” (Masson and Morier, 2012, p. 17)  
SMS organizations that manage by “fear” on the other hand lack this potential for learning as 
Godkin et.al (2009) argues; “arrogantly disordered organizations, however, contain cultural 
themes that are hostile to healthy inter-group and interpersonal conflict. One way to 
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understand the prohibitions is to examine managerial assumptions and premise control” 
(Godkin and Allcorn, 2009, Section: "The arrogant organizational disorder"). 
2.1.3 Reporting a vital part of the SMS input 
Reporting is considered an essential part of the SMS, both as an information channel in to the 
management, i.e. Safety Assurance (SA) and as a factor to change Safety Promotion or 
policies. The reporting system has a mandatory reporting system, and a voluntary reporting 
system. The mandatory system is requirements put forward by the authorities, mishaps, 
technical breakdown with significant operational impact, incidents and accidents and a lot 
more. The voluntary part is designed to get information which would otherwise not emerge to 
the surface, and hopefully learn from the issues before others end up in a similar situation 
with a less fortunate outcome (ICAO, 2013).  
In the same manner as ICAO, the EU regulation “376/2014” describes and highlights the 
importance of reporting to retain effectiveness in the aviation safety work at all levels. The 
authorities (EASA), called “The Agency”, the state, and the organizations are all required to 
establish a SSP/SMS reporting system (See citation #6 below).  As mentioned, the reporting 
systems are in place to facilitate learning, not punishment, and to give the authorities and 
operators the possibility to be proactive in the aviation safety work. (EU, 2014): 
 “(6) In order to improve aviation safety, relevant civil aviation safety information 
should be reported, collected, stored, protected, exchanged, disseminated and 
analysed, and appropriate safety action should be taken on the basis of the 
information collected. This proactive and evidence-based approach should be 
implemented by the relevant aviation safety authorities of Member States, by 
organisations as part of their safety management system and by the Agency.”(EU, 
2014, Section 6) 
“(8) It is necessary to ensure that front-line aviation professionals report occurrences 
that pose a significant risk to aviation safety. Voluntary reporting systems should 
complement the mandatory reporting systems, and both should allow individuals to 
report details of aviation safety-related occurrences. Mandatory and voluntary 
reporting systems should be set up within organisations, the Agency and competent 
authorities of the Member States……”(EU, 2014, Section 8) 
The ICAO SMM list five basic characteristics to have an effective safety reporting system, 
information about the system as whole, flexibility in engagement level, willingness or 
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motivation for reporting issues, accountability and learning and the will to implement reforms 
(ICAO, 2013, p. 2-17). These are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
 
Figure 11, Five basic characteristics of effective safety reporting (ICAO, 2013, p. 2-17) 
2.2 Effective safety reporting, the five basic characteristics 
The five basic characteristics are discussed below; information, flexibility, willingness, 
accountability and learning (FAA, 2016b). They are interrelated and this should be kept in 
mind when perceiving the discussion.  
In addition to SMS safety reporting, this paper focuses on pilot employment models and the 
models influence on the effectiveness of safety reporting and learning potential. This is 
discussed after the description of the five basic characteristics of an effective reporting 
system.  
Reason’s words on effective reporting will serve as an introduction: 
“Effective risk management depends crucially on establishing a reporting culture. 
Without a detailed analysis of mishaps, incidents, near misses, and “free lessons,” we 
have no way of uncovering recurrent error traps or of knowing where the “edge” is 
until we fall over it.”(Reason, 2000) 
2.2.1 Willingness and accountability in the system of “just culture” 
Both the mandatory and the voluntary system have a non-punitive approach, i.e. learning not 
punishment is the main objective, but the ICAO SMM makes it clear, it is a dilemma:    
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“….Policies that distinguish wilful acts of misconduct from inadvertent errors, 
providing for an appropriate punitive or non-punitive response, are essential to assure 
the effective reporting of systemic safety deficiencies. Not only is a -absolute no blame 
culture unreasonable, it is not even feasible. While management gains safety 
information, the system will be ineffective if it interferes with appropriate punitive 
actions. Conversely, a culture that fails to distinguish unintentional errors/mistakes 
from acts of wilful misconduct will inhibit the reporting process. If personnel avoid 
reporting for fear of punishment, management does not gain important safety 
information.”(ICAO, 2013, p 2-12). 
The above is the essence in the “Just Culture” system, accountability and protection. This is a 
delicate balance between trust and accountability (Dekker, 2007). The statement also makes it 
clear that effectiveness cannot be retained if the organization fails to build the culture of trust, 
accountability and safety.  
The EU regulation also promotes a “just culture” and distinguishes between willful 
misconduct or mishaps, and human errors.  
“(20) The objective of the exchange of information on occurrences should be the 
prevention of aviation accidents and incidents. It should not be used to attribute blame 
or liability or to establish benchmarks for safety performance.”(EU, 2014, Section 20) 
(34)  In order to ensure the confidence of employees or contracted personnel in the 
occurrence reporting system of the organisation, the information contained in 
occurrence reports should be protected appropriately and should not be used for 
purposes other than maintaining or improving aviation safety. The internal ‘just 
culture’ rules adopted by organisations pursuant to this Regulation should contribute 
in particular to the achievement of this objective. In addition, the limitation of the 
transmission of personal details, or of information allowing the identification of the 
reporter or of the other persons mentioned in occurrence reports, by a clear 
separation between the departments handling occurrence reports and the rest of the 
organisation, may be an efficient way to achieve this objective (EU, 2014, Section 34). 
Even the national laws are advocating this rights and the importance of protecting a reporter 
or a person disclosing information in and out of investigations and so on 
(Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016). 
This balancing act between protection of the practitioner and accountability is the key to 
fewer errors (Dekker, 2007). A just culture is essential, the dilemmas are mainly where and 
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who to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. The expertise in the 
particular field has a clear role in this judgement, but how? And finally what level of 
protection shall we give safety data (reports/investigation data, analysis of electronical data 
etc.) against legal interference? These questions are not easy to answer, but Dekker argues 
that our tendencies to judge what seemed right at the moment to the practitioner are always 
judged in hindsight and from the outside in (Ibid). The “Miracle at Hudson” where the crew 
managed to “ditch” (the term used by pilots to land on water) an Airbus A320, may suit as an 
example of “Just Culture”. The investigation (expertise) proved, in the simulator, it doable to 
return to LaGuardia Aerodrome and make a safe landing, but barely so, only when the test 
pilots where given all facts and instructions to start the turn immediately for a safe return they 
succeeded. When they were given a 35 seconds delay to grasp the fact that they had a dual 
engine failure, due to a flock of birds, the test pilots failed. Captain Sullenberger (practitioner) 
was finally freed and given credit for the miracle at Hudson River (NTSB, 2010). The fact 
that the investigators put them self in the shoes of Sullenberger and not only judged him in 
hindsight makes this a good example of just culture in the context of investigations (not 
portrayed so in the film “Sully”). Dekker makes it clear that the intention of a just culture is 
not to “free” the practitioner that fails, but to have fewer errors and learn, or in other words an 
improvement-oriented perspective on accountability (Dekker, 2007). 
2.2.2 Motivational factors influencing work as done vs organizational commands 
In this paper we will not go into a deep discussion of motivational factors, but look at some 
factors that affect pilot willingness towards self-reporting. 
Hackman and Oldham’s (1976) central work on critical psychological states on intrinsic 
motivation are still alive; experienced meaningfulness, responsibility for outcome and 
knowledge of results of the work. Another highly cited study is Deci and Ryan (1985), 
(2009), self-determination theory of three fundamental psychological needs: Competence, 
autonomy and relatedness.  
Autonomy is the basic need in humans to experience self-determination, and the feeling to 
endorse the cause of a behavior as one’s own (Deci and Ryan, 1987), and in contrast to 
controlling environments: 
“When self-determined, people experience a greater sense of choice about their 
actions, and these actions are characterized by integration and an absence of conflict 
and pressure. Indeed, integration is the ultimate hallmark of autonomous regulation. 
By contrast, controlling events and contexts conduce toward compliance or defiance 
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but not autonomy. Control, whether by external forces or by oneself, entails regulatory 
processes that are more rigid, involve greater pressure and tension and a more 
negative emotional tone, and result in learning that is more rote oriented and less 
integrated.”(Deci and Ryan, 1987, p. 1033) 
Satisfaction of competence needs, such as improving one’s abilities predict performance 
outcomes, or with the satisfying words of competence from Deci and Ryan (1985):  
“…that social-contextual events (e.g., feedback, communications, rewards) that 
conduce toward feelings of competence during action can enhance intrinsic motivation 
for that action.” (Deci and Ryan, 1985, p. 70) 
Not getting to emotional, relatedness, the human need to be valued, respected and seen or 
desired plays a clear role in intrinsic motivation (Cerasoli et al., 2016) even though Deci and 
Ryan (1985) played down the role originally but in their paper of  2000 they argued 
relatedness to be a need for meaningful relationship with others. 
To sum up basic needs the extraction from Autrey (2015) serves as an example. Procedures 
are fine, but what matters at 3 AM when no one is watching is: -What’s in it for me? (Autrey, 
2015, Loc. 1027-1039) 
Hollnagel (2014) makes a clear distinction between what the blunt-end (management) believe 
is done, “work as imagined” and what the sharp-end (pilots) really do, “work as done”. This is 
also a motivational factor towards reporting willingness, because when the sharp-end adopts 
their own procedures to get the work done self-reporting could turn into culpability and 
disciplinary action. Again possible negative consequences might be outweighed by “what’s in 
it for me?” -Even when the learning potential in the organization is high.  
Pilots face a rigid system of regulations and procedures, and it might seem hard to image a 
large degree of autonomy, nevertheless it is two basic ways to pilot compliance.  The 
procedural way and the framework approach. The latter give the pilot autonomy to operate 
within a framework and adopt their work based on knowledge and experience in addition to 
basic procedures. This is typically seen in legacy carriers. This will probably give a higher 
level of perceived competence than just strict procedural compliance. If we believe Hackman 
and Oldham or Deci and Ryan (2009), (1985, 1987) the responsible outcome of the work will 
probably give a higher degree of satisfaction or meaningfulness and a feeling of 
accountability towards the outcome. 
Other factors have also been shown to be important towards self-reporting willingness, 
reporting system ease of use is one such factor. A study conducted among healthcare 
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professionals showed that the perceived usefulness, ease of use, subjective norm, and trust 
had a significant effect on the reporter willingness to use the system. Further findings were 
that management support had a direct effect on the mentioned issues, and that subjective norm 
had the most influence on trust. (Wu et al., 2008) 
2.2.3 Information, flexibility and Learning 
FAA (2016b) states that the understanding of the whole, the knowledge of the interactions and 
system wide implications are understood by all parties in a safety system. The flow of 
information, both inputs and outputs in the safety system need knowledgeable persons that are 
capable to extract the information and draw conclusions and learn.  
Flexibility in reporting modes are essential to have an effective safety reporting system. The 
flexibility should be understood as mode shift, i.e. bypass reporting levels in the organization 
when it matters do reach the decision level quickly (FAA, 2016b).  
The information flow and understanding, the flexibility of reporting modes and learning 
ability in the organization is tightly connected, that is through the goal of collective and 
individual learning. Some of the literature on the matter is highlighted below. 
Collective learning is a complicated matter in a system or organization, understanding latent 
and active errors in an organization is one aspect as Reason (1990), (1995) argues, others like 
Abrahamsson et al. (2010) claims the importance of a system wide framework for analyzing 
emergency response, and Hollnagel (2014) puts it as the underlying reasons for an incident 
are not easy to detect, hence not easy to learn from.  Numerous articles describe the system 
wide problems involved with identifying, analyzing safety risks, collecting and providing 
information and learning from it all (Abrahamsson et al., 2010, Sklet, 2004, Kontogiannis et 
al., 2000, Catino, 2008). Maslen and Hayes (2015) sum it up this way: “…the burgeoning of 
research on incident reporting has captured how these systems are limited both by the 
information they capture and their management (Maslen and Hayes, 2015, p.2).  
Deverell (2009) concludes, very simplified, that either we have single-loop learning, i.e. 
learning from a single cause, or double-loop learning, i.e. not only individual learning, but 
underlying causes as well, and both are equally important to understand. Further the learning 
potential is embedded ‘in’ the sharp-end and it is often managed within the individual and not 
brought to the surface as organizational learning (Lam, 1997, Lam, 2000). 
Hale and Borys (2013)  concludes “The quality management and auditing industry favour 
written procedures for these reasons of transparency, and hence create major incentives for 
companies to write weighty procedure manuals, but tend then to be blind to the gap with 
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reality which a paperwork-based system audit does not pick up”. The reasons Hale and Borys 
(2013) are referring is the difference between their two models, one model“transparent and 
explicit” the other as “tacit knowledge and emerging set of routines” (Ibid, 3. Conclusion) or 
as Hollnagel puts it “work-as-imagined and work-as-done”(Hollnagel, 2014, Loc 635 
"Kindle version"). Pilots work are deeply regulated and procedures are the routine of the day 
(Hales “explicit model”), but nevertheless some of the greatest “saves” from a catastrophic 
outcome has required the crew to fall back to “tacit knowledge” (ATSB, 2013, p. 33-38, 
NTSB, 2010). This duality in some professions are also recognized by Hale and Borys (2013); 
“The ‘participating and supporting’ and particularly the ‘delegating and observing’ 
leadership styles are suitable for a workforce with high competence and variable or high 
commitment, such as pilots, surgeons…”(Hale and Borys, 2013, 3. Conclusion). 
Learning from incidents and investigation reports are important, but we also have to learn 
from experience of more subtle character, or put differently;  “…learning from weak signals”  
(Drupsteen and Wybo, 2015, p. 30). Brizon and Wybo (2009) clarifies the barriers we have to 
overcome to learn from experience; detection, interpretation, transmission and priority 
settings, in that order.  Further they claim that the motivation and trust, both of the sender and 
the receiver, are essential for this communication to occur. If the sender has enough 
knowledge to detect and interpret the weak signals, but have no trust or support in the 
organization, it will not be emitted. Flip the coin and the receiver will not use the information 
if the sender is not trusted. ICAO (2013) SMM supports an anonymous voluntary reporting 
system to make the barriers easier to overcome for the sender. 
To recap, one of the reasons why SMS was implemented is the framework to address the 
difficulties described above. 
2.3 SMS, Errors, Reporting, Just Culture and organizational links to aviation safety 
summed up 
The Safety Management System has been put forward to facilitate learning and hence have a 
proactive function in the aviation safety work. The safety culture is essential to promote 
reporting of errors and detect latent errors in the organization. The “just culture”, non-punitive 
but not free from accountability system, are vital in this respect. Without learning potential 
and or non-detected errors and mishaps the organization has no means of being proactive in 
the safety work, and as a consequence the authorities will also be left with reactive safety 
promotion.  The key element in a safety culture is that it promotes learning for the good of 
aviation safety in the future.  
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Hypothesis 1: The SMS system need to have the characters of mutual “just culture”, 
openness, trust and support to receive reports, in addition the systems need channels and 
flexibility to promote the information to the sharp-end in a trustworthy manner. If any of these 
factors are violated from the management the pilots will not self-report and the safety 
management system will lose effectiveness. 
2.4 Pilot employment models in European Aviation 
Historically pilots have been directly employed by the national carriers (AKA network or 
legacy carriers). This was typically an open-ended contract, a stable and predictable 
employment model, further a rigid seniority system among pilots, giving rights such as 
commander upgrade, salary, vacation, aircraft type ratings etc., and made the pilots loyal to 
the company, i.e. it was little incentives to start at the bottom in another company.  
A couple of decades ago aviation liberalization started and open skies (SES) and EU 
regulations on free flow of workforce, made it easy to employ pilots in atypical models, the 
LCC understood this to the full and numerous employment models have emerged. Today both 
legacy carriers and LCC use atypical models to some extent (Jorens et al., 2015). 
In 2015Ghent University produced a large report on atypical employment in aviation. The 290 
pages describes the employment models among European pilots and the legislation, or myriad 
of legislations, surrounding the employment models (Jorens et al., 2015). This paper will only 
explain the various employment models Jorens et al. (2015) identified and not look at the 
legislation, but only highlight how hard it is to overview this: 
“Employment conditions…. Not only do discrepancies exist in this regard between 
national large airlines and national LCCs, additional discrepancies are furthermore 
observed between national LCCs vis-à-vis foreign LCCs with operating bases in the 
respective Member States” (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 57) 
2.4.1 Atypical employment models in aviation 
To describe a “typical” employment model you only need an employer and employees, with 
open-ended or fixed term contracts between them, but when it comes to “atypical” models 
there are plentiful employment versions (Jorens et al., 2015).  
Atypical employment (extracted from Ibid). 
 Self-Employed. The basic form of non-traditional employment is the pilot self-
employed model; both this and the traditional fixed-term have a limited time frame 
and a direct contract with the end user (airline) of the labor. Typically 6 months 
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contracts, may be renegotiated if the employer warrants, but salary, home base etc. is 
up for discussion at renewal. The legislation is however not clear as the self-employed 
is resident in one country, getting salary paid in another country and the firm is 
registered in a third country. The different EU countries have different legislation in 
different member states. 
 Fixed-term work via (temporary) work agencies. Introducing a work agency or maybe 
a temporary work agency complicates the picture further, a fourth country legislation 
is one problem, but more important to the pilot is the breakup of the direct connection 
to the AOC holder. Illustration of this in a bogus self-employment model with three 
parties: 
 
Figure 12, Bogus self-employment via intermediary agencies model (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 40) 
 Bogus self-employment. Introducing a fourth party, and possible a fifth legislation, has 
become common, that is additional breakup of the work agency where the “employee” 
only deliver the labor service to the work agency, which formally deliver service to the 
AOC holder, and all other contracts as salary etc. go through an intermediate agency. 
An illustration is appropriate: 
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Figure 13, Atypical employment; complex employment relationships (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 38) 
 Zero-hour contracts. To complicate the matter there are other aspects too. A zero-hour 
contract implies you are called in to perform one flight, if this is supplied through a 
system of “bogus self-employment” through a temporary work agency etc. the 
employee rights are quite scarce. 
 Pay to Fly (PtF). These contracts make the employee pay for the right to accumulate a 
number of flying hours. Typically a contract guarantees a number of flying hours. 
(Flying hours is crucial to get a new and possibly better contract). In such contract the 
employee doesn’t get paid, but pay the airline for the right to fly. 
(Jorens et al., 2015) 
An airline, that is the mother company, may have several Airline Operating Certificates and in 
each of these we could have a service provider structure like this: 
 
Figure 14, AOC holder and flight crew structures (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 208) 
A pilot facing this setup would probably have difficulties grasping what legislation governs 
his employment. This citation might suit to illustrate the difficulties an employee face: 
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“An airline registered in European country A might hire a worker from country B 
and base this worker in country C. The worker in question might be hired via a 
(temporary work) agency under a ‘contract for services’ as a self-employed person in 
order to reduce labour costs (e.g. social insurance payments) and in order to shift 
business risks from the airline onto the worker.” (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 38) 
The grouping used in the result and discussion part of this paper is typical or atypical 
employment contracts. Jorens et al. (2015) found that younger and/or less experienced pilots 
hold atypical contract to a greater extent than older and/or more experienced pilots. 
2.4.2 Safety reporting, employment models and fear of retaliations 
EU regulation no 376/2014 recognize the possibility that fear of self-incrimination is a 
possibility: 
“(43) Individuals may be discouraged from reporting occurrences by the fear of self-
incrimination and the potential consequences in terms of prosecution before judicial 
authorities.”(EU, 2014) 
An independent review on Network Rail found under-reporting of accidents (lost-time 
injuries) from staff and middle management to be driven by real and perceived pressure and 
fear (RSSB, 2011). Two of the more noticeable,  to aviation, factors listed was “frequent 
company reorganizations” and “the procurement strategy used to drive down costs and 
improve efficiency leading, for example, to the primary contractor companies making much 
greater use of temporary („zero-hours‟) type contract staff.” (RSSB, 2011, p.5) The parallel 
to aviation must be considered when employees are “transferred” from direct employment to 
some sort of atypical work agency/SME model. 
 “Atypical… Additionally, as a result of abuse with respect thereto, which potentially 
amounts to social dumping vis-à-vis flight and cabin crew members, such atypical 
relations furthermore endanger not only the health and safety of those employed, but 
equally so the safety of air operations. This is in stark contradiction to the European 
legislative provisions in this regard” (Jorens et al., 2015, p.40)  
The lack of studies among pilots and the link between employment models, fear of negative 
consequences, and safety reporting create some difficulties, but the large survey (6633 
European pilots responding, (Jorens et al., 2015)) gives a clue to the current state of the 
affairs. 
Jorens et al. (2015) found pilots decision-making process towards “objections regarding flight 
safety, liability, or regarding health & safety” (Ibid, p 144) to be influenced by employment 
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models, 37 % stated that their own employment status influenced the decision-making 
process, and 46 % meant their colleagues employment status may affect their ability to make 
decisions. The differences between Low Fare Airlines and traditional airlines are further 
described like this: 
“….. 20% of the respondents stating to be self-employed strongly disagreed with the 
statement ….. Of these 20%, 83% indicated that they fly for an LFA. Furthermore, 
another 26.6% 'generally' disagrees with said statement, of which 90% (!) indicated 
they fly for an LFA. In 85.2% of the cases, the respondents stated this is decided by the 
registered office of the airline.  
When asked if they were sometimes reluctant to take such decisions out of fear of 
possible negative consequences for their professional careers, 64.3% of respondents 
answered in the affirmative!  
When asked if they think colleagues are sometimes reluctant to take such decisions for 
fear of possible negative consequences for their professional career, even more 
respondents, i.e. 79.7%, answered affirmatively!”  (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 217) 
The above citation will serve as an indication of fear as a motivational factor for not self-
reporting issues, and an indication that fear of retaliations, contract termination, decision 
making etc. is widespread in European aviation. 
2.4.3 Pilot employment models & fear of self-reporting summed up 
Hypothesis 2 below tries to sum up typical, atypical employment models, fear of retaliations 
and safety pitfalls due social dumping issues. 
Hypothesis 2: Differences within contract types, age groups, experience level, position and 
roles and the type of company will show differences towards self-reporting willingness, 
perceived safety support, fatigue issues and just culture, and hence indicate differences 
towards the possibility to retain SMS effectiveness. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Choosing the method 
3.1.1 Structural background information 
The structure of this paper is based on the findings in the London School of Economics (LSE) 
pilot safety culture survey conducted in 2016 (Reader et al., 2016) and the Ghent survey of 
2015 on atypical employment models in European aviation (Jorens et al., 2015).  
The LSE survey is a undertaking of Future Sky Safety, which in turn is an EU-funded 
transport research program in the field of European aviation safety (Reader et al., 2016) and 
the Ghent report is an action financed by the European Commission (Jorens et al., 2015) . 
Both studies based their reports on quantitative data collected among European pilots, 7239 
(14% of population) and 6633 respectively (Reader et al., 2016, Jorens et al., 2015). 
This study has four key elements, reporting, just culture, support from management and 
fatigue; this is further divided into differences between pilots groups (age, experience, 
employment contract, previous contract, company type and management role as the primary 
divisions). The four key elements are derived from some of the most notable findings in the 
LSE survey (mean scores differences in the spider diagram below).  
“… over half of the sample of pilots (50.05%) felt that fatigue was not taken seriously 
within their organisation (while 28.83% neither agreed nor disagreed) and less than 
20% agreed that their company cares about their well-being“. 
(Reader et al., 2016, p 6) 
 
Figure 15 LSE: Means all safety dimensions by Contract type (Reader et al., 2016, p. 24) 
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The LSE survey found the mean values for “fatigue” (2.82) and «perceived organizational 
support” (2.65) to be below what is considered concerning (Ibid). In addition it is possible to 
read out some differences to the interwoven items of “just culture” and “reporting” between 
typical and atypical employment models.  
To get a better understanding of the key findings in the LSE and Ghent reports among Nordic 
pilots, i.e. pilots flying for major Nordic operators through typical and atypical employment 
models, this paper also base its results on quantitative data. The reason is mainly to be in line 
with the other studies and to have a comparison possibility (validate findings) due to equal 
demographic categorization.  
Further the move from one clearly defined system to a more differed system of employment 
models (E. M. Giemulla, 2011)  and the applicability in Nordic countries, which have 
traditionally had a strong management and union cooperation and strict legislation in this 
field, is of great interest, i.e. do employment models restrict/influence this openness. 
Based on the theoretical discussion it is reason to believe that the efficiency of the Safety 
Management System is greatly dependent on the key elements in this study, i.e. reporting, just 
culture, safety support and fatigue (FAA, 2016b). 
3.1.2 Qualitative and Quantitative measurement, -extensive/intensive methods 
When designing a study we soon run in to a clear distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Johannessen et al., 2004, p. 35). While the qualitative method  “do not 
attempt to quantify their results through statistical summary”(Marczyk et al., 2005, Loc. 232 
of 3236, ebook), the quantitative approach, on the other hand, makes “use of statistical 
analyses to obtain their findings” (Ibid, Loc. 232). Qualitative methods typically use 
observations and interviews in gathering data, and is often used first to later use a quantitative 
approach to prove a hypothesis (Ibid).  
While an interview is characterized by in depth intensive questions on an idiographic level, a 
questionnaire is characterized by extensive group study, i.e. nomothetic (Ibid), and the goal is 
to identify the views “of the average member of the group being studied” (Ibid, Loc. 236 ). 
Typically the social science relies on a quantitative method (Ibid). 
3.1.3 Snowball sampling 
The Ghent University used a quantitative snowball sampling method (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 8) 
which LSE adopted in their survey method (Reader et al., 2016, p. 41). Snowball sampling is 
a technique for finding hard to reach subjects. One subject leads to another and the snowball 
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grows as it rolls, “this is an especially useful technique when the researcher wants to contact 
people with unusual experiences or characteristics who are likely to know one another”  
(Vogt and Johnson, 2011, p. 368).This technique is often used to reach hidden populations 
(Morgan, 2008, p.816), such as atypically employed pilots (Jorens et al., 2015) .  
Advantages of Snowball Sampling 
 The chain referral process allows the researcher to reach populations that are 
difficult to sample when using other sampling methods. 
 The process is cheap, simple and cost-efficient. 
 This sampling technique needs little planning and fewer workforce compared 
to other sampling techniques.  
Disadvantages of Snowball Sampling 
 The researcher has little control over the sampling method….  
 Representativeness of the sample is not guaranteed…. 
 Sampling bias is also a fear of researchers when using this sampling 
technique. Initial subjects tend to nominate people that they know well….  
(NN, 2017) 
3.1.4 The method chosen; -Descriptive Extensive Snowball sampling 
This paper uses a descriptive approach where the study categorize phenomena or views on 
safety support, reporting, fatigue and the cross reference category of  just culture, this may 
lead to an understanding in views regarding the member of the average group (Marczyk et al., 
2005).  
By using an electronic questionnaire we will reach a large population, where we have a broad 
gathering of views, or in other words an extensive approach. 
The quantitative method is based upon an inductive method where the empirical findings will 
back the theoretical background (Johannessen et al., 2004, p. 55).  
3.2 Methodological framework & Designing the research  
3.2.1 A cross-sectional electronic design and analysis 
The research question may be understood as a phenomenological question  and a 
phenomenological research approach (Johannessen et al., 2004, p.86) could have been used 
on a smaller population, but both the Ghent and the LSE surveys use a large cross-sectional 
design. Choosing a similar approach makes it possible to compare and possibly validate the 
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results. Validity of such an approach is further discussed in the “Quality and validity & 
Selection” of informants chapter below.  
The population (also discussed in “Quality and validity & Selection of informants”) is a 
subset of the two other surveys, but still quite large (N=339). The subset consists of pilots 
flying for Nordic operators, directly or indirectly through third parties, and divided into two 
main groups; those with an unlimited permanent (typical) employment and those with atypical 
employment contracts. The relative large population is suited for an electronical 
questionnaire. 
An electronic survey has these characteristics: 
 Relatively easy to get a large number of respondents in a small time frame. 
 Reduce the possibilities of interpretation and influencing answers from respondents. 
 The standardization of pre-coded questions and answers makes it possible to evaluate 
category differences and equivalences. 
 Statistical analysis is easy to make and to illustrate in graphs and/or tables. 
(Johannessen et al., 2004, p. 277) 
The questionnaire, survey and analysis, where managed through  the “Questback”  survey 
platform (Questback, 2017). (The electronic survey was available between January 23
th
 and 
February 28
th
 2017. Reminders where sent from some of the below listed unions in section 
3.4.2).  
3.2.2 Survey structure, the big picture 
The survey can be broken down in these main parts. (Described in the “Data collection,…” 
chapter and the individual questions in clusters are found in the “Result” part): 
1. Respondents demographics, i.e. base country, nationality, age, company (AOC), type 
of company, contract type, years at current employer, part-time, title, management 
role, income, block hours, aircraft type, and if less than 5 years at current employer 
then the survey ask for contract type at previous employer. 
The demographic variables are equal to the LSE survey (Reader et al., 2016, p. 39) , 
except for income and contract type at previous employer, and the wording has been 
slightly altered to suit the pilot language when it comes to flying experience. To 
reduce the number and suit the research question some of the LSE demographics 
questions were skipped. The LSE survey have a similar but not equal to the 
demographic layout of the Ghent study (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 91-138) 
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Copying most of the described demographic layout will make it possible to make 
comparisons in this and future studies, i.e. validate possible findings in the future. 
2. Company demographics: The research questions focuses on one of the pillars in the 
Safety Management System; General reporting, information (support and safety 
promotion) and reporting / handling of fatigue issues. Hence additional company 
demographics focus mainly on reporting structures, i.e. implementation of SMS, 
reporting systems (voluntary, mandatory, confidential), pilot agreements, CAA 
reporting system, and the characteristics (proactive/reactive). These questions are 
unique to this survey.  
3. Questions focusing on perceived safety support, reporting, just culture and fatigue 
relative to the research question. In addition there are some questions dependent on 
previous answers.  
The total number of questions is quite large (54), but not all questions are asked all 
participants, the logic ask different questions depending on previous answers, such as contract 
type, number of years on current contract etc. All questions except two have pre-coded 
answers, but some have the possibility to give an “other” statement. For instance there is no 
category for retired pilots, but their answers might still be valid and categorized within the 
“other” group. The two open ended questions at the end of the questionnaire gives the 
participants the possibility to disclose other issues. 
3.3 Challenges, limitations & mitigations 
The pilots on atypical contracts are extremely hard to reach because many lack union 
membership (Jorens et al., 2015) and are self-employed, because of this the survey was 
forwarded to OSM (OSM, 2017) one of the largest providers of contract pilots to the Nordic 
marked, but no answer was received nor was it registered links etc. on their web-page, see 
Appendices: “Mail to OSM”. 
However, some of the pilots reached from the unions have friends and colleagues, whom fly 
on atypical contracts outside the Nordic countries, but still for Nordic operators, the survey 
therefore asked the respondents to forward a link to these pilot colleagues. The uncertainties 
in total number reached makes it difficult to put an exact number on the total population, 
further the population varies from season to season, some operators terminate contracts during 
winter months and hire or lease pilots during summer season.  
Only one union provided their number of members, despite reminders to do so. 
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The survey was further limited to only the major issues disclosed in the LSE survey, there are 
a lot of aspects of interest, but all of these lay outside the scope of this paper; -do employment 
models reduce/enhance the effectiveness of the Safety Management System. Many of the 
questions are equal to the LSE survey, i.e. pilot demographics and a couple of questions in 
each section, however company demographics, such as SMS and reporting systems are unique 
to this survey and so are most of the other questions on each of the subjects of management 
safety support, just culture, reporting and fatigue.  
Other challenges are, of course, my lack of experience in the field of scientific research and 
my experience as a professional pilot on an unlimited permanent contract for 27 years.  
The first challenge has been mitigated by advises from my institution, University Nord, in 
analyzing, and in checking questions before release. The questionnaire were also tested by 
other pilots and once again changed based on the feedback before release. The assistance from 
Ph.D. Tom Reader at LSE in releasing the questions, not their data, before finalizing their 
own report was of great help. This resulted in a more pinpointed questionnaire in line with the 
research question. 
The second challenge was a two edged sword, first I might be biased because of my long 
experience in aviation, and on the other side I have seen the evolution in aviation 
employment, safety work and not leased seen the pendulum swing when it comes to 
focus/happiness/frustration among old and new pilots for nearly three decades. To enhance an 
objective picture I have used the LSE survey as a basis for my survey, electronic gathering 
without the possibility to interfere respondents, and to mitigate my bias towards some sort of 
employment model I have used equal and neutral questions when it comes to questions where 
I use a logical criteria to provide different questions based on previous answers, for instance 
“if you had a permanent contract would you....” versus “if you had a temporary contract 
would you….”. This second challenge is further discussed in the ethics chapter (3.7) and in 
the validity of the questionnaire and survey as a whole is discussed in the next chapters. 
3.4 Quality and validity & Selection of informants 
3.4.1 External and internal validity & generalization; -the survey in general 
Most researchers agree that the three general goals of scientific research are 
description, prediction, and understanding/explanation (Marczyk et al., 2005, Loc 
223). 
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The LSE survey describes relationships between categories of pilots (based on employment 
models) (Reader et al., 2016) and “trust/mistrust” towards basic pillars of the safety 
management system as theorized above. Especially the subjects of safety support, fatigue and 
just culture are pointed out as noteworthy.  The validity of the LSE survey are greatly based 
on Eurocontrol long lasting studies into this subjects, but slightly altered to suit pilots and not 
only air traffic controllers (Ibid). The Eurocontrol surveys “that has been psychometrically 
validated in the European Air Traffic Management industry” and used extensively on air 
traffic controllers and in the LSE pilot safety survey (Reader et al., 2016, p. 15). This internal 
validation is extrapolated to this paper. 
External validity of this paper and the LSE findings may be done by generalization or 
replication (Marczyk et al., 2005). This paper tries to replicate or describe such relationships 
between the focus eras and the subset of pilots, those who fly for Nordic operators, and hence 
validate or discard the findings. Such findings will make an external validation of the LSE 
survey and vice versa. The external generalization may be limited due to cultural differences, 
even within Europe, and Tear et al. (2016) found this to be a valid consideration. The 
principles found in the mentioned study have not been extended to this paper and not done by 
the LSE survey either. The Scandinavian (Nordic) work environment is characterized by 
openness, flat hierarchy and the willingness to speak up is high, hence the pilot views in this 
survey might not be representative for other groups, such as eastern or southern European 
pilot groups (Tear et al., 2016). Limitations due to cultural differences, and external 
generalization limitations outside the Nordic pilot group, should be held in mind when 
reading this survey: 
“As organizations become increasingly multi-national, internal policies and actions 
the organization makes must take into account national culture, specifically with a 
focus on power distance. We show that power distance affects the safety perceptions of 
some occupations within an organization but not others. We also show that power 
distance can lead to greater differences in safety culture perceptions between 
superiors and subordinates”. (Ibid, p. 1626) 
Generalizing on the subject may further be done with similar studies among different subset, 
or replicated in its entirety, but if the compasses, of this paper and the LSE survey, align, the 
general reliability indicates an increased confidence in the findings (Marczyk et al., 2005). 
The value of replication cannot be overstated, and is a strong indication of reliability 
(generalization) and we may have greater confidence in the results (Ibid, location 213). 
31 
 
Generality outside of those studied cannot be done directly (Johannessen et al., 2004, 
Marczyk et al., 2005), but the similarities in structure of safety management in different 
branches make this an interesting question, i.e. safety culture across branches. Even with this 
limitation of generalization in mind I would like to point out the possible  generality to 
healthcare (Kohn et al., 2000, Hollnagel, 2014, Gordon et al., 2012, Deilkås, 2014, Frøyshov, 
2016, Helsetilsynet, 2016) and other branches such as off-shore (Petroleumstilsynet, 2016), 
HMS (Dekker, 2013b, Dekker, 2014, Dekker, 2012b, Dekker and Woods, 2010, Townsend, 
2013) and the nuclear industry(Autrey, 2015, Hayes and Maslen, 2015, Hollnagel, 2014), to 
mention some. Politically, large unions (Parat, 2016, LO, 2015) media and politicians, are 
focusing on temporary work force regulations and the impact on safety issues. A quick search 
on the Norwegian term “midlertidig ansatte” (temporary employed) in Norwegian newspaper 
articles, January 1
st
 2016 to December 31
st
 2016, revealed 452 articles on this search term 
alone (ATEKST, 2017). The large number of books, “political focus” and articles emphasize 
this possible external generalization. 
The internal validity in this paper, i.e. make it implausible to make alternative conclusions or 
findings, is harder to prove, but it may seem hard to argue against findings such as mistrust 
towards the safety management system among the users, the experts or if you like “the sharp 
end” (Hollnagel, 2014, Dekker, 2007, Autrey, 2015); here the pilots. Both the Ghent and LSE 
surveys discovered differences between typical and atypical employed groups, but both 
surveys suffered from quite low response rate, 12-14% of the total European pilot population 
(Jorens et al., 2015, Reader et al., 2016), and only a fraction of this group where atypically 
employed (Ibid). This survey predicts similar problems. To mitigate this, the group of 
typically employed pilots has been divided into two groups, -one group with less than 5 years 
of employment, and another with 5 or more years. The first group is asked additional 
questions about their previous contract (atypical and typical) and this makes it possible to 
emphasize the views from the atypically employed pilots. 
The internal validation towards the research question is further discussed below, first some 
words on the selection and collection of informants. 
3.4.2 Selection and collection method of informants 
To reach most of the pilots operating for Nordic airlines/operators, the survey was distributed 
through pilot unions in the Nordic countries. Most are umbrella organizations with 
members/sections from numerous companies. Some of the “sub-unions” did not participate, 
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hence the total number of members in the listed organizations do not reflect the population 
reached in the survey.   
 Norway: LO and Parat who are mother organizations for different unions in 
Norwegian aviation.  Both typically and atypically employed members, but the vast 
majority is typically employed. 
 Sweden: SPF a mother organization for different unions in Sweden. Mainly typical 
employed pilots, but atypically members too. 
 Denmark:  
DPF: Mainly typically employed pilots. 
DALPA: No response. 
 FPA, Finnish mother organization for different Finnish pilot unions, reluctant at first, 
distributed the survey only the last few days of the survey response window. 
In an effort to reach more atypically employed pilots a request to participate where sent to the 
Spanish and British umbrella associations. These associations organize a large number of the 
atypically employed pilots flying for Nordic operators, even though the AOC is registered 
elsewhere (mainly Ireland). 
 BALPA: British Air Line Pilot Association, number of sub-divisions flying for Nordic 
operators. No known response. 
 SEPLA: Spanish airline pilot association. Organize several pilot groups flying for 
Nordic operators. No known response. 
None of the above organizations provided the number of members, except one LO member 
union. 
All participating respondents were urged to forward the survey to atypically employed pilots 
in their network.  
Another challenge is the quite large number of surveys among European pilots in recent years, 
which increase the possibility of a relatively small participation rate. To front this challenge a 
pledge to remind their members to participate was sent to the above organizations.  
3.4.3 Validity pilot population and subsets: 
Validity refers to what degree the research reflects the research question (Marczyk et al., 
2005), and in this case the research question refer to differences between pilot employment 
models when it comes to the pillars of the SMS. The categorization used, typically and 
atypically employment, is directly derived from the Ghent study (Jorens et al., 2015) and 
further used, among other divisions, in the LSE study (Reader et al., 2016). Both the fact that 
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my categorization of pilots refers the research question and its use by other large studies, 
hence validated by them, makes this categorization valid and accurate when referring to my 
research problem. 
The reliability, i.e. the consistency of the measurement (Marczyk et al., 2005) when it comes 
to the pilot categorization, the quality may be assured in an equal way. The use of pre-coded 
answers in categorization enhance this consistency, but some historical facts may negatively 
influence this measurement; -It looks like the Ghent study have triggered temporary work 
agencies to use “permanent contract” in advertising pilot jobs, even when the jobs actually fall 
into the category of “fixed term employment”, i.e. same as permanent in most aspects but 
time limited, and/or “through a work agency”. This may bias the respondents to choose 
“permanent employment contract” and reduce the consistency of this measurement (see 
recommendations). 
The Ghent survey found the European Cockpit Association (ECA, 2016)  respondents to be 
most reliable (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 9). This paper uses a similar population, a subset of ECA 
member associations. The reliability will further increase with a higher number of 
respondents, outliers and its effect on statistical regression may then be minimized. 
The EASA (EASA, 2015) statistics show an excellent record when it comes to fatalities in 
aviation, especially the fall in such accidents during the period 1960-1990 and thereafter on an 
extremely low rate of approximately 1:10
-7.  The “young” generation, whom has “grown up” 
with this excellent statistics and rhetoric from the authorities, might be biased to take this for 
granted and older pilots may be biased to think everything was better in the old days, pre-
new-employment models. Dekker (2012b), Townsend (2013)and Hollnagel (2014) argues that 
a successful outcome of a risky operation has nothing to do with statistics, but the work as 
done, every time, and the basis towards this success is the safety culture. Therefore pilots was 
further categorized in age, years in aviation, flying hours and company type groups, this 
makes it possible to look at “generation differences”. The fact that older, and more 
experienced, pilots tend to have typical employment contracts (Jorens et al., 2015), than those 
with less experience makes this distinction possible.  This categorization may further validate 
the research question. 
3.4.4 Validity of concepts building the safety culture; SMS, reporting etc.: 
Validation of concepts, i.e. in this study SMS, reporting, just culture, safety support and 
fatigue, depend on the interaction between the dependent and independent variables and their 
connection to the research question.  
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Dependent/independent variables in short: 
Dependent variables are, in short, influenced by independent variables, for instance in this 
study the dependent variable SMS effectiveness is influenced by the willingness to self –
report (Marczyk et al., 2005, Loc. 564). 
Independent variables, on the other hand, are independent of the outcome being measured, i.e. 
the willingness to self-report, in itself, is independent of the outcome of the effectiveness in 
the safety management system (Ibid).  
Some continuous variables where converted to categorizing variables, such as age, income, 
experience etc. these where grouped in intervals. 
Mandatory SMS organizations, Authorities and companies, validity: 
The Safety Management System, as theorized earlier, is a mandatory system for Airline 
Operator Certificate (AOC) holders and Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA). The guidelines are 
in Europe regulated by EASA and at a national level defined in the national legislation 
(Samferdselsdepartementet, 2016, §2-16 mm, EU, 2014, EU, 2010). The variables of SMS 
and Company demographics are crucial for validating the research question. The variables 
“SMS effectiveness”, “Civil Aviation Authorities” and “company” are dependent on a large 
number of independent variables and grouped in the tables found in the results section. The 
dependent variables, SMS, CAA and Company together with the independent variables are 
used in multivariate analysis. The variables are directly linked to the research question hence 
valid in this context. The external validity across safety related branches is not clear, but the 
health, oil, nuclear and entrepreneur sectors are looking to the aviation sector in organizing 
the safety management (Townsend, 2013, Dekker, 2012a, Hollnagel et al., 2013, Autrey, 
2015). Revealing concerns and pitfalls in the aviation sector is consequently of external value. 
Trust is a key value (Ibid) in all safety work and especially reporting willingness (EU, 2014), 
consequently a consistent trust/mistrust across independent variables from the reporters, i.e. 
the pilots, will enhance the reliability of findings towards the dependent variables mentioned. 
3.4.5 Trustworthiness; Reliability of pilot groups and answers  
To gain confidence in the survey and urge the respondents to answer honestly (Johannessen et 
al., 2004), the survey where published with an information page, at the start and end of the 
survey, which pointed out the following: 
 Title, institution name and information about the candidate, level and objective of the 
research question. 
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 Anonymity; both the respondents and company names and connections thereof would 
not be revealed in the report. 
 Voluntary   participation. 
 Timeframe of the survey. 
 Estimated time to complete survey. 
 Candidate contact information, phone number and e-mail address. 
 Thanks for participating. 
 Information about LSE survey, and 
 A request to forward the survey to fellow pilots, especially those on atypical contracts. 
(Ibid) 
Validity and reliability of pilots, authorities and the SMS have been clarified above. The 
reliability of the answers is harder to evaluate, but as mentioned a large degree of 
trust/mistrust will be a good indication when it comes to the frustration level among pilots. 
The survey used a “Likert-type” scale from 1 to 5, strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, 
strongly agree, on most questions concerning the confidence in a large number of issues. This 
was consistent with the LSE survey. The number of alternatives is manageable in the analysis 
and not to hard grasp for the respondent (Ibid).   
The respondents may of course have different views on the meaning of aviation safety; -What 
is safety? Furthermore not all pilots may be aware of the safety management system, statistics 
and reporting systems available, this is relevant in the context of SMS effectiveness, i.e. if 
users of the implemented system are unaware of the functions, the safety information and 
safety feedback, the SMS probably lack effectiveness. To enhance the understanding of pilot 
safety views an open ended question where appended at the end of the survey.  The comments 
give this survey a possibility to evaluate the reliability of the respondents and disclose other 
areas of concern. 
Grouping of answers 
Answers was grouped to suit the research question, not all possibilities where investigated in 
this paper. In other words it is the sum of the objective views within the clusters that is 
analyzed, not individual views or questions within these dimensions.  
The questionnaire went through a pretest as described earlier (the institution and pilots where 
given the opportunity to forward their views and suggestions before final release) to enhance 
the validity and reliability. The next chapter reveals the variable fundament supporting the 
research question.  
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3.5 Data collection, grouping, variable levels 
 
Figure 16, The grouping of questions supporting the research question 
The above figure illustrates the Safety Management System and interaction between the 
grouping of questions and this system. “Just culture” is, as theorized above, a fundamental 
characteristic of an effective SMS. This basic feature supports the three other main objects 
studied in this paper; fatigue, reporting willingness, and perceived safety support.  This 
grouping together with employment models builds the data collection used to evaluate the 
research question.  
Main sections of the data collection: 
 Pilot demographics. 
 Reporting. 
 Safety support.  
 Fatigue. 
 Just culture. 
 Miscellaneous questions, which fit several of the above categories. 
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 Company SMS demographics.  
 Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) demographics. 
The actual questions in each of the safety culture clusters are found in respective result 
chapters, and the tables have been reduced to only question used in analyzing the research 
question. The full list of questions and answers are found in the appendix.  
3.5.1 Norwegian legislation aspects on data storage and collection 
Collecting and storing sensitive information, such as personal data, may trigger concession or 
notification requirements in Norway. Norwegian legislation prohibits electronically storing of 
personal data that may identify a person. –But if the persons are anonymous, i.e. it is not 
directly or indirectly possible to identify persons participating in the survey, no such 
concession is required. (Johannessen et al., 2004, Johannessen, 2009, p.36-37) 
In this survey it is not possible to identify persons directly or indirectly based on combination 
of answers, hence no concession or notification is needed. 
EASA, CAA on the other hand may be identified, as they are official institutions, but this 
does not trigger approval either.  
3.5.2 Data analysis, statistical methods 
Data analysis process flow logic used in the analysis (additional explanation below the flow 
description): 
1. Export data from Questback to IBM SPSS. 
2. The data will be screened for errors, i.e. check inputs to be within allowable range, and 
if so it will be used in the analysis, else the item will be discarded. 
3. Descriptive statistics will be performed on relevant data, i.e. data used in this paper. 
The categorical variables checked (frequency checking, T-Test, ANOVA):  
a. Age, Flying Hours, Job title, Years employed. (Used to group experienced and 
not so experienced pilots). 
b. Type of Company. (Used to group operators, Network, LCC, Helicopter etc.).  
c. Contract type, previous contract type (only if less than 5 years at current 
employer), Management role. (Used to group pilots). 
d. Where company names are given the company names will be substituted with 
numbers, this data has been removed in this report. 
All value variables except those not used will be checked (Descriptive statistics). 
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The open ended question (no. 53) will be extensively modified due to the sensitive 
character and categorized into new category variables, i.e. two new variables will 
categorize the highest and the second highest threat to European aviation. Those 
pointing to more than two safety issues, giving identifying names or non-relevant 
comments will be discarded after extraction of the variables mentioned above.  
4. Modify data for further analysis, including reverse negatively worded questions, 
grouping of data and adding up group scores.  
Group comparisons, demographics and analysis strategy 
Numerous culture groupings are possible due to the large demographics collection. The ones 
focused on are: Age, Position, Management Role, Company type, Contract type and Previous 
Contract type. All except one, Company type, consisted of two groups after recalculation.  
“One-way ANOVA” will be used to analyze the Company Type group, and “Independent-
Samples T-Test” analyzing the other groups. 
Independent-Samples T-Test strategy: 
1. Check homogeneity of variance using a Levene’s test. 
a. If significant variance above .05 continue using numbers in first line assuming 
equal variance. 
b. If below p=.05 use numbers in second line and assume unequal variance. 
2. Check if the zero hypothesis is valid (sig two-tailed) 
One-Way ANOVA strategy:  
1. Check homogeneity of variance using a Levene’s test. 
a. If equal variance proceed with “Schaffe” post hoc comparisons. 
b. If unequal variance: 
i. Check robustness of variance using the conservative “Welch and 
Brown-Forsyth” test. 
ii. If ok proceed with “Games-Howell” post hoc comparisons. 
The above strategies are in line with the LSE safety culture survey (Reader et al., 2016, p. 43). 
Clusters used 
The grouping of questions in safety culture dimensions were used for: 
 Just Culture 
 Reporting 
 Fatigue 
 Perceived Safety Support 
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The grouping follows LSE dimensions, but in the LSE survey the two first were grouped 
together.  
The logic in the safety cluster grouping is illustrated below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For all T-Tests and ANOVA tests results this report use recommendations from Pallant 
(2016); Reference for the recommendations: Independent-samples t-test (Ibid, Loc. 6130) and 
for ANAOVA (Ibid, Loc. 6439). 
General checking of data: 
Pallant (2016) recommendations for checking data in SPSS will be used; frequency, 
descriptive statistics, scale responses within margins, means, ranges and standard deviations 
for all relevant items will be checked for reliability. Were possible pair-wise deletion of 
missing data will be used. Reversing of negative worded question was also done before 
conducting IBM SPSS analysis. 
Effect sizes of group calculations were performed were appropriate using Cohen’s d. 
3.6 Other involved parties 
Other involved parties than described above, i.e. pilots working for Nordic operators, are: 
 European national CAA, mainly the Nordic Civil Aviation Authorities. 
 European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA. 
All of these organizations may be recognized and identified in the results section, question 19, 
52 and 53. Only European authority organizations may be identified. The pilots and their 
companies on the other hand is 100 % unidentifiable.   
3.7 Researchers biases & Ethical considerations 
Traditionally pilots have been directly employed by their Airline (AOC Holder), given a 
seniority number and the career governed by this number ever after; Privileges such as 
choosing aircraft type, long-haul/short-haul, promotion to captain, salary advancement, 
pensions, vacation, rotations and so on are all according to your number on the list. Today 
 “Reporting” Group/Cluster 
Used in the analysis. Scores 
summarized and mean values 
calculated etc. 
Reporting Q1 
Reporting Q2 
Reporting Q3
Reporting Q4
Reporting Q5
Figure 17, Grouping illustration valid for Reporting, Just Culture, Safety Support and Fatigue 
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different employment models gives pilots the opportunity to swap employers at a larger scale, 
but still the best payed and safest jobs (social security systems, pensions, health insurance 
etc.) are found at the traditional network carriers with seniority lists, hence the real possibility 
to swap employer is limited (Jorens et al., 2015). 
Twenty seven years of seniority in the same company, on a typical contract, gives me little 
choice than continue on such a contract. My comfort zone would severely be challenged if I 
elected, or was forced, to change this into some sort of self-employed contract through a third 
or fourth party work agency. 
My long experience and employment contract type may bias me to look upon typical 
permanent contracts as better towards safe operations and safety culture building. On the 
other side it also puts me in a position to evaluate trends and changes in the safety work the 
last three decades, and last but not least, my life inside the cockpit door gives me a unique 
opportunity to catch what is boiling in colleagues heads and pin point areas of concern. 
My position might prejudice my views on the questions raised, but if this survey prove them 
false, nothing would be better towards the safety work in European aviation. –And if the 
research questions reveal a problem this would be an encouragement for action, either 
politically or to motivate new surveys to enlighten us more. Anyhow this survey may put 
European aviation in a less flattering light, and it may be on the edge of whistle blowing, and 
I am aware of the consequences this might have on my career, especially if I elect to seek a 
new employer in the open marked, but I hope and believe in just culture in this respect too.  
In the role as a researcher I noticed Townsend (2013) recommendations on using sensitive 
data, and tried to put his views first when conducting this survey.  
 Strict anonymity of participating companies and personnel. 
 Preservation of company confidential information. 
 A trusting relationship of equals based on mutual respect and inter-dependence. 
 Humility. 
 A two-way dialogue. 
 The ability to listen. 
 No preconceived notions. 
 The ability to cope with challenge and disagreement. 
 The ability to stand back from the detail and see overall patterns of data. 
 Not passing judgement on any one individual or company.  
(Townsend, 2013, Loc. 1670) 
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Not all of the recommendations are equally relevant in my quantitative survey, but anonymity 
of persons and companies are vital. All company names are deleted in the report, and neither 
relevant in the context of the research question. 
The open-ended questions might disclose findings that should be treated with confidentiality, 
e.g. company names, confidential company information, competition advantages, offending 
language etc. based on the guidelines adapted above, all of these questions will therefore be 
deleted in the report, but categorized and labeled based on my interpretation, only the value of 
each category will be reported.  
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4 Results  
The survey where conducted from January 23
th
 to February 28
th
 2017, and a total of 339 valid 
answers were received. IBM SPSS statistics version 24 was used to analyze the results. 
For comparison reasons the structure follow the LSE safety culture survey(Reader et al., 
2016, p. 68), but with fewer questions in each cluster. The interpretation of “mean” values in 
each safety cluster should be as follows: 
 Below 2.5:  this is considered concerning, most respondents are negative (Ibid), 
 2.5 to 3.5: open for interpretation (Ibid) 
 Above 3.5: is considered positive (Ibid) 
For some questions the scale were reversed to compensate for negative wording.  
Short statistical summary: 
 Mean: The average score of all respondents in the group, i.e. the level of agreement 
with the question. Reversed item indicates a reversed scale do to negative wording in 
the question, i.e. consistency relative to flight safety, high number is better in this 
aspect. 
 Standard deviation indicates the spread in responses. High number indicates high 
spread. 
 Range is the scale of possible responses, Minimum (min) is the lowest used response, 
and Maximum (Max) is the highest response in the range.  
 Independent-samples T-Test is used to compare two independent groups versus some 
continuous variable. When three or more groups ANOVA were used to make the 
comparison. 
 The p.-value indicates the level of significance, i.e. is the difference due to chance. 
 Effect size is used to describe the strength of the difference between the groups. 
Cohen’s d were used, guidelines for interpretation:  
o small   0.1 to 0.29 
o medium 0,30 to 0,49 
o large  0,50 to 1,0 
(Pallant, 2016) 
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It is important to point out, that possible findings, supporting correlations between 
effectiveness in the SMS and employment models do not indicate a direct prediction of 
the  safety level on a particular flight etc., but maybe, and only maybe, a flight safety 
problem in an organization or civil aviation authority. The correlation can only be used 
to predict the potential for the safety management system to stay effective, or as 
Marczyk et al. (2005) puts it “Correlation Does Not Equal Causation”. 
4.1 Population, gross subset, fallout, net subset, demographics results 
The Nordic pilot population in commercial aviation is hard to estimate, many hold a valid 
license, but not all use it for a living. Snowball sampling exaggerates this uncertainty, when it 
comes to the number reached. My best estimate of the total number reached is Ntotal = 2000-
3000 commercial pilots.  
This gives a respond rate in the range 11% to 17 %, and this is in line with the LSE (14% 
(Reader et al., 2016, p. 45)) and Ghent (more than 10% (Jorens et al., 2015, p.13)) respond 
rates. The Ghent survey concludes on this number like this; “The high participation rate 
makes it possible to give a clear overview of the current aviation sector” (Ibid). 
4.2 Pilot/Company demographics & Main clusters supporting the research question 
The results for the listed groups are given in the following order: 
 Pilot demographics & Company SMS demographics 
 Just culture & Reporting.  
 Safety support.  
 Fatigue. 
4.2.1 Pilot demographics & Company demographics 
Base and nationality demographics 
97 % of the respondents were based in Nordic countries; this number was higher than sought 
despite considerable efforts to reach pilots flying for Nordic operators on foreign bases. 
Numbers are shown in the table and the graph below.  
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Pilots based in country 
  
  
N N % 
DP1 Base Denmark 66 19,5 
  
 
Norway 191 56,3 
  
 
Sweden 44 13,0 
  
 
Finland 28 8,3 
  
 
Total Nordic based pilots 329 97,1 
  
 
Belgium 3 0,9 
  
 
Bulgaria 1 0,3 
  
 
Ireland 1 0,3 
  
 
United Kingdom (UK) 3 0,9 
  
 
Other  2 0,6 
  
 
Total number of pilots outside 
Nordic bases 
10 2,9 
    Total 339 100,0 
Table 1, Pilots based in country  
 
Figure 18, Nordic vs Non-Nordic based pilots 
Similarly the nationality was skewed with 97.6 % Nordic pilots. This was expected because 
many of the pilots flying for Nordic operators “abroad” are Nordic by nationality.  
Pilot Nationality 
      N N% 
DP2 Nationality Danish 54 15,9 
  
 
Norwegian 177 52,2 
  
 
Swedish 70 20,6 
  
 
Finnish 28 8,3 
  
 
Icelandic 2 0,6 
  
 
Total Nordic pilots 331 97,6 
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Belgian 3 0,9 
  
 
Croatian 1 0,3 
  
 
French 1 0,3 
  
 
Hungarian 1 0,3 
  
 
Italian 1 0,3 
  
 
Polish 1 0,3 
  
 
Total outside Nordic nations 8 2,4 
    Total 339 100,0 
Table 2, The nationality of the respondents 
Pilot age, title, contract type, management role, years, block hours, previous contract 
The following table shows the pilot demographics. The Age category is evenly distributed 
with one third below 30 years and one third above 50 years and the rest between 30 and 50 
years of age. 58 % are captains and the rest flight officers (copilots, first or second officers). 
A vast majority (94%) have what is called a permanently contract, this issue are further 
discussed in the “discussion” part of this report. 6% of the respondents holds a management 
role. 21 % of the pilots have been employed less than 5 years at their current company, and 13 
% has collected less than 3000 flying hours. Those with less than 5 years employment at 
current employer were asked about the contract type they had with their previous employer, 
N=70. 49 % had an atypical contract and 40% a typical contract, while 11% did not have a 
previous contract. This together with experience, number of years in business, age show 
young and less experienced pilots hold atypical contracts at a higher rate. 
Pilot Demographics 
   
N N % 
DP3 Age 18-30 37 10,9 
  
 
31-40 66 19,5 
  
 
41-50 114 33,6 
  
 
51-60 116 34,2 
  
 
61+ 6 1,8 
    Total 339 100,0 
DP9 Title Captain 195 57,5 
  
 
First Officer 142 41,9 
  
 
Second Officer 2 0,6 
    Total 339 100,0 
DP6 Contract type Typical     
  
 
Permanent 320 94,4 
  
 
Atypical     
  
 
Pay to fly 1 0,3 
  
 
Zero hours contract 2 0,6 
  
 
Fixed term contract  7 2,1 
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Self-employed 5 1,5 
  
 
Total atypical 15 4,4 
  
 
Other  4 1,2 
    Total 339 100,0 
DP10 Management Role Yes (flight operations) 3 0,9 
  
 
Yes (training manager) 3 0,9 
  
 
Yes (other) 15 4,4 
  
 
Total Management 21 6,2 
  
 
No 318 93,8 
    Total 339 100,0 
DP11  Years employed Less than 1 year 10 2,9 
  
 
1-4 years 61 18,0 
  
 
Total less than 5 years 71 20,9 
  
 
5-10 years 60 17,7 
  
 
11 + years 208 61,4 
  
 
Total  more than 4 years 268 79,1 
    Total 339 100,0 
DP13 Block hours 0-300 hrs 2 0,6 
  
 
301-1000 hrs 17 5,0 
  
 
1001-3000 hrs 25 7,4 
  
 
Total less than 3000 hrs 44 13,0 
  
 
3001-5000 hrs 42 12,4 
  
 
5001-10000 hrs 75 22,1 
  
 
10000+ hrs 177 52,2 
  
 
Total more than 2999 hrs 294 86,7 
  
 
Total 338 99,7 
    Missing 1 0,3 
DP12 Employed less than 
5 years, previous 
contract  
Typical     
  Permanent 28 40,0 
  Atypical     
  N=70 Pay to fly 1 1,4 
   Zero hours contract 11 15,7 
   Fixed term contract  12 17,1 
   Self-employed 10 14,3 
   Total atypical 34 48,6 
   Other  8 11,4 
    Total 70 100,0 
Table 3, Pilot demographics 
Company SMS demographics 
Company & Safety Management System demographic questions and distribution is shown in 
the following table. The vast majority 87% of the companies had, according to the pilots, 
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implemented a Safety Management System, 12 % of the pilots did not know if their company 
had such a system. The SMS has the characteristics of being both proactive and reactive. 
More or less all companies had implemented a mandatory, voluntary and confidential 
reporting system with scores in the high 80’s (percent) for all three categories of reporting 
systems, and 75% had an agreement with the pilots safeguarding their anonymity.  The pilot 
group was divided in three main groups in respect to company type; Network (71%), Low 
Cost Carriers (LCC, 10%) and Helicopter (10%). This division is less skewed than the other 
demographic groups. 
Company demographics 
      N N% 
DC2 
SMS 
implemented 
Yes 296 87,3 
  
 
No 3 0,9 
  
 
I don't know 39 11,5 
  
 
Total 338 99,7 
  
 
Missing 1 0,3 
    Total 339 100,0 
DC3 
SMS 
characteristics 
Proactive 83 24,5 
  
 
Reactive 39 11,5 
  
 
Both Proactive and Reactive, 
equally so. 
130 38,3 
  
 
I don't know 42 12,4 
  
 
Total 294 86,7 
  
 
Missing 45 13,3 
  
 
Total 339 100,0 
DC4M Mandatory 
reporting system 
Yes 299 88,2 
  No 18 5,3 
  
 
I don't know 13 3,8 
  
 
Total 330 97,3 
  
 
Missing 9 2,7 
    Total 339 100,0 
DC4V Voluntary 
reporting system 
Yes 297 87,6 
  No 12 3,5 
   I don't know 20 5,9 
   Total 329 97,1 
   Missing 10 2,9 
    Total 339 100,0 
DC4C Confidential 
reporting system 
Yes 289 85,3 
  No 18 5,3 
   I don't know 26 7,7 
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   Total 333 98,2 
   Missing 6 1,8 
   Total 339 100,0 
DC5 Agreement 
safeguarding a 
just reporting 
environment 
Yes (Union/Collective  
agreement) 
253 74,6 
  
Yes (Company policy 
agreement, no Union) 
51 15,0 
   No 15 4,4 
   I don't know 20 5,9 
    Total 339 100,0 
DP5 What type of 
company do you 
work for? 
Network 242 71,4 
 Low cost LCC 35 10,3 
 Helicopter 33 9,7 
  Total Network/LLC/Helicopter 310 91,4 
  Charter/leisure 3 0,9 
  Cargo 2 0,6 
  Business/General Aviation 6 1,8 
  Other  18 5,3 
  Total Others 29 8,6 
  Total 339 100,0 
Table 4, Company demographics & company SMS characteristics 
Question DC6 below prioritize what pilots consider to be the main focus area within their 
safety organization. Low numbers indicate high priority. Human factors and Pilot Procedural 
errors are prioritized first and Latent Errors within the organization after the two mentioned 
categories. This is contradictory to one of the reasons to implement a Safety Management 
System; -to detect latent errors. An additional ANOVA analysis where conducted to detect 
differences in the company type group. No significant differences were noticed, except a 
small difference between LCC and Network with post hoc Games-Howell test and the focus 
area Pilot Procedural error. Indicating LCC had a slightly higher focus on this than the 
network carriers. 
 
DC6 In my company's safety organization I consider the main focus area towards flight 
safety performance to be: 
Overall average Prioritized as 
Focus areas Mean N 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 
Latent/organizational errors 2,32 302 26,2% 20,2% 48,7% 5,0% 
Pilot Procedural errors 1,92 311 37,0% 37,9% 21,2% 3,9% 
Human factor errors 1,80 317 39,7% 41,0% 18,3% 0,9% 
Other 3,72 200 3,0% 3,5% 12,0% 81,5% 
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Figure 19, Overall average scores of company safety focus areas (low numbers better) 
Before proceeding reading the results, some final words of caution:  
Skewness in the groups referred is quite large, and the typical/atypical group and the 
management role/non-management role group fall outside the acceptable skewness statistic 
criteria of -2 to 2. 
Skewness in groups used 
 
N Skewness 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error 
Age below 40 or 40+ 339 -,857 ,132 
Captain or FO 339 ,306 ,132 
Typical & Atypical employment contract 339 4,736 ,132 
Management or Not 339 -3,651 ,132 
Previous Contract type 339 -1,434 ,132 
Network, LCC or Helicopter 339 1,542 ,132 
Table 6, Statistical skewness within groups analysed 
4.2.2 Just culture & Reporting clusters analysis 
Just Culture Cluster 
Questions analyzed in the cluster of Just Culture are described in the tables below. Individual 
questions are shown in the first table and the sum of all the questions in the cluster in the 
second table.  
Individual questions, Just Culture: 
All questions received responses covering the full range (1-5) of options. Missing results are 
low, Nmissing = 0-5, Ntotal = 339. Mean values are in the high range, values above 3.5 are 
considered high, and individual mean values range from 3.53-4.13. Even though all questions 
indicate a positive view, the standard deviation indicates a lot of variation among pilots. 
The table below shows the results and the questions included in the Total Just Culture Cluster. 
  
2,32 
1,92 
1,80 
3,72 
1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00
Latent/organizational errors
Pilot Procedural errors
Human factor errors
Other
Average 
Table 5, Priority of company safety focus areas, low Mean value indicates high priority 
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Individual questions in the Just Culture Cluster 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
JC1: The company's report investigation 
team makes a clear distinction between a 
deliberate/gross violation and an 
unintentional error/mistake. 
338 4 1 5 3,97 ,831 
JC2: If there is NO "reckless conduct, gross 
negligence or willful misconduct" 
performed the organization and the pilots 
always have a sheared responsibility when a 
mishap occur. 
337 4 1 5 3,53 ,916 
JC3: Pilots who report safety-related 
occurrences are treated in a just and fair 
manner by my company. 
339 4 1 5 4,13 ,863 
JC4: If there is NO "reckless conduct, gross 
negligence or willful misconduct 
performed", self-reporting errors would 
have NO consequences to my career. 
339 4 1 5 3,86 ,975 
JC5: If I reported an error I am confident 
my company would treat me according to 
"just culture" principles, i.e. make a clear 
distinctions between human errors and 
"reckless conduct/ gross negligence/willful 
misconduct". 
336 4 1 5 3,88 ,944 
Valid N (listwise) 334      
Table 7, Just Culture question by question 
The total Mean and standard deviation for the Just Culture cluster is shown below. The mean 
value (3.86) is considered to be high (above 3.5) 
Total scores for the Just Culture Cluster 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
Total Just Culture Cluster 339 4 1 5 3,86 ,718 
Valid N (listwise) 339      
Table 8, “Just Culture cluster” total mean score 
Total Reporting Cluster 
Questions analyzed in the cluster of Reporting are described in the tables below. Individual 
questions are shown in the first table and the sum of all the questions in the cluster in the 
second table.  
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Individual questions, Reporting Cluster: 
All questions received responses covering the full range (1-5) of options. Missing results are 
low, Nmissing = 0-5, Ntotal = 339. Mean values are in the high range, values above 3.5 are 
considered high, and individual mean values range from 3.50-4.71. In the high end we have 
the encouragement to file reports (Mandatory (4.71), Voluntary (4.25)) and at the low end if 
pilots always file mandatory fatigue reports (R5) at M=3.5. Even though all questions indicate 
a positive view, the standard deviation indicates a lot of variation among pilots, especially R5. 
The table below shows the results and the questions included in the Total Reporting Cluster. 
Individual questions in the Reporting Cluster 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
R2M: My company encourage me to 
file reports about?: Mandatory flight 
safety issues 
338 4 1 5 4,71 ,645 
R2V: My company encourage me to file 
reports about?: Voluntary flight safety 
issues 
337 4 1 5 4,25 ,847 
R2C: My company encourage me to file 
reports about?: Company related issues 
336 4 1 5 4,04 1,029 
R3: My company always submits pilot 
reports, with a required authority 
reporting issue, to the authorities? 
337 4 1 5 4,01 1,004 
R5: I always file a fatigue report when it 
is required by the authorities. 
338 4 1 5 3,50 1,128 
JC3: Same as in JC Cluster 339 4 1 5 4,13 ,863 
JC4: Same as in JC Cluster 339 4 1 5 3,86 ,975 
JC5: Same as in JC Cluster 336 4 1 5 3,88 ,944 
Valid N (listwise) 330      
Table 9, “Reporting Cluster”, question by question 
The total Mean and standard deviation for the Reporting cluster is shown below. The mean 
value (4.04) is considered to be high (above 3.5) 
Total Reporting Cluster. 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
Total Reporting Cluster 339 4 1 5 4,03 ,683 
Valid N (listwise) 339      
Table 10, Reporting Cluster total mean score 
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Objectives of the reporting system (own company) 
The below table show an additional question were the reporting system objectives are 
prioritized. Low mean numbers indicate high priority. Individual and organizational learning 
(1.63) is prioritized first followed by Trend analysis (2.17) and the requirement to Fulfill 
Obligations towards authorities (2.26). The objective to Put Blame (4.06) is prioritized last 
with the category “other”. Below the table a chart illustrating the priorities are shown. 
R1: In my opinion; -The main objectives of my company's reporting system is: 
  Overall average Prioritized as 
Focus area SD Mean N 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 
Learning 0,9 1,63 317 60,9% 19,6% 15,5% 3,8% 0,3% 
Put blame 1,17 4,06 177 8,5% 3,4% 5,1% 39,5% 43,5% 
Fulfill obligation 
towards regulators. 
0,9 2,26 292 27,4% 21,9% 48,3% 2,1% 0,3% 
Trend 0,75 2,17 316 14,6% 58,9% 22,8% 2,5% 1,3% 
Other 0,77 4,23 170 1,8% 1,2% 6,5% 53,5% 37,1% 
Table 11, The Reporting system objectives prioritized; low "Mean" value indicates high priority 
 
Figure 20, The Reporting system objectives prioritized 
To check differences between company types (Network and LCC) an independent T-Test was 
conducted on the reversed mean values (for consistency with all other tests). An ANOVA test 
was run on all company types. Both test showed no significant differences, except for the T-
Test. The mean values to illustrate the difference in focus areas are shown below. Both LCC 
and Network carriers prioritize learning first, but LCC carriers focus more on the fulfillment 
of obligation than to detect trends. Another noticeable non-significant difference shown in the 
spider diagram is the higher focus on putting blame by LCC as perceived by the pilots 
employed. 
1,63 
4,06 
2,26 
2,17 
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1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00
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Figure 21, Differences between company type and the Mean scores of reporting objectives 
Fatigue and mandatory reporting 
The issue of fatigue reporting was used to check if pilots actually file mandatory reports. The 
question shows 19.5 % always follow the requirement to file a report. If you include the 
“agree” score in this group 56.4 % follow the requirement, while 20.6 % do not fulfill their 
obligation towards mandatory reporting and 22.8% are neutral.  
R5: I always file a fatigue report when it is required by the authorities. 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
Disagree 
18 5,3 5,3 5,3 
Disagree 52 15,3 15,4 20,7 
Neutral 77 22,7 22,8 43,5 
Agree 125 36,9 37,0 80,5 
Strongly Agree 66 19,5 19,5 100,0 
Total 338 99,7 100,0  
Missing System 1 ,3   
Total 339 100,0   
Table 12, Do all pilots file fatigue reports when it is mandatory? 
The mean value (3.5) is at the limit of the range indicating room for interpretation (2.5-3.5).  
R5, Descriptive statistics 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
I always file a fatigue report when it is 
required by the authorities. 
338 4 1 5 3,50 1,128 
Valid N (listwise) 338      
Table 13, Mean score; do all pilots file fatigue reports when it is mandatory? 
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
Latent
Put Blame
Fullfill ObligationTrend
Other
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To further validate if pilots do file mandatory fatigue reports all of the respondents answering 
other than “strongly agree” (Nsubset=272) to the above question (R5) were give an additional 
question asking to estimate the number of skipped fatigue reports the last 12 months. The 
answers indicate 181 pilots out of the 272 asked had skipped one or more mandatory reports 
the last 12 months. 8 participants’ selected the “no answer” option. This result is in contrast to 
the R5 question above. An independent sample T-Test found no differences between those 
employed in LCC and Network, when analyzing skipped reports. Similar T-tests were 
conducted between age groups, position groups, previous contract groups and current contract 
type groups all showed non-significant differences towards skipping mandatory reports. Out 
of curiosity a similar T-Test was run on the Management role groups, this test showed the 
same pattern, those pilots with management roles skip mandatory fatigue reports at the same 
rate as non-management pilots (61 % vs other pilots at 67 % skip rate). The distribution is 
shown in a table further down.  
The tables and graphical illustrations of skipped mandatory reports are shown below. 
 
R6: Your previous answer indicates you don't always file fatigue reports 
when required, approximately how often have you skipped a fatigue 
report the last 12 months? 
Number of skipped reports Frequency Cumulative Percent 
Valid 0 80 29,7 
1-3 120 74,3 
4-6 38 88,5 
7-10 11 92,6 
10+ 12 97,0 
No answer 8 100,0 
Total 269  
Missing System 3  
Total 272  
Table 14, Number of skipped mandatory fatigue reports the last 12 months 
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Figure 22, The percentage is based on respondents answering 1-4 in question R5 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Safety support cluster analysis 
Questions analyzed in the cluster of “Pilot perceived safety support” are described in the 
tables below. Individual questions in the first table and the sum of all the questions in the 
group in the second table, the latter is illustrated graphically.  
Individual questions: 
All questions received responses covering the full range (1-5) of options. Missing results are 
low, Nmissing = 0-5, Ntotal = 339. Mean values are in the high range, values above 3.5 are 
considered high, and individual mean values range from 3.53-4.09. In the high end we have 
“willingness to speak up” and “the ability to learn”. In the lower end, but still at high values, 
we have “feedback” and “support when stepping down from duty due to fatigue”. Even 
though all questions indicate a positive view, the standard deviation indicates a lot of variation 
among pilots. 
 
Skipped reports or No reports 
skipped 
Management Role Non-Management 
Count % Count % 
 No skipped reports 7 39% 73 29% 
One or more skipped 11 61% 170 67% 
No Answer 0 0% 8 3% 
Table 15, Pilots with management role, skip rate of mandatory fatigue reports 
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Individual questions in the safety support cluster: 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
S1: In my company; Voicing 
concerns about safety is encouraged. 
337 4 1 5 3,96 ,923 
S2: In my Company; We get timely 
feedback on the safety issues we 
raise. 
339 4 1 5 3,53 ,977 
S3: I am prepared to speak to my 
direct manager when unsafe 
situations are developing. 
339 4 1 5 4,09 ,920 
S4: Information about safety-related 
changes within this company is 
clearly communicated to staff. 
335 4 1 5 3,79 ,900 
S5: We learn lessons from safety 
related incident or occurrence 
investigations. 
335 4 1 5 4,06 ,733 
S6: People in this company share 
safety related information. 
334 4 1 5 3,86 ,812 
F1: My company fully supports my 
decision if I step down from duty 
because of fatigue. 
336 4 1 5 3,74 1,032 
Valid N (listwise) 330      
Table 16, “Perceived Safety Support” cluster, question by question 
Total pilot perceived safety support cluster analysis: 
In the table below we have the sum of the questions above. The Mean value (3.83) indicates a 
favorable view overall on perceived safety support from the company. Standard deviation 
indicates a quite large variation. The favorable view is illustrated in the bar chart below. A 
total of 90 % are favorable towards own company safety support. Only a small fraction is 
found in the other end. 
Total pilot perceived safety support. 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Total Perceived Safety Support 339 4 1 5 3,83 ,747 
Valid N (listwise) 339      
Table 17, Mean score of “Perceived Safety Support” cluster 
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Figure 23, Distribution of responses in the total pilot “perceived safety support” cluster 
4.2.4 Fatigue cluster analysis 
This cluster mainly consist of six questions, where two are directly safety related and the rest 
indirectly safety related i.e. cultural questions. One of the questions is also included in the 
reporting cluster (R5). The two questions directly related to flight safety has been reversed to 
have a consistent scale, negative answers is considered bad for flight safety. In the tables this 
gives a consistent expression and an easier comparison.  
Results for questions related to fatigue and reporting is given in separate tables in section 
4.2.2 above. 
In addition all participants, depending on contract type, where given an additional question 
related to fatigue and employment model. This is illustrated in separate tables and graphs. 
Fatigue individual questions analysis: 
The response rate where high with Nmissing in the range of 0 to 3, and Ntotal = 339, valid N 
=334. All questions utilized individually the full scale of options (1-5). 
The general picture is diverged and “Mean” values differ from 2.22 to 3.8, and with rater high 
standard deviation also indicating large individual differences. 
The first four questions have high mean values and are considered positive, except for “F4: 
The issue of fatigue is taken seriously by this company.” This falls into the range where we 
have room for interpretation (2.92) and in the lower half of this interval, but with a high 
standard deviation. 
The two last questions have been reversed (F2_rev & F5_rev), this is done to have 
consistency in the table, i.e. a low number indicates a concerning value. (This paper considers 
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a tired pilot a risk to safety; similarly if a pilot colleague is fatigued to a level where safety is 
at risk, this too is considered negative). These two questions have a means at 2.2 and 2.64, 
and both have high standard deviation indicating considerable differences among pilots. 
These two questions are grouped together and analyzed further later.    
Individual questions in the fatigue cluster 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
F1: My company fully 
supports my decision if I step 
down from duty because of 
fatigue. 
336 4 1 5 3,74 1,032 
F3: I would feel comfortable 
to complete a fatigue report. 
338 4 1 5 3,80 ,985 
F4: The issue of fatigue is 
taken seriously by this 
company. 
337 4 1 5 2,92 1,076 
R5: I always file a fatigue 
report when it is required by 
the authorities. 
338 4 1 5 3,50 1,128 
F2_rev: Pilots in this company 
are often tired at work 
(reversed scale) 
338 4 1 5 2,22 ,919 
F5_rev: Colleagues are 
sometimes fatigued to a level 
where flight safety is at risk 
(reversed scale) 
339 4 1 5 2,64 ,985 
Valid N (listwise) 334      
Table 18, “Fatigue cluster”, question by question 
The total fatigue cluster analyzed: 
The questions above have been clustered together and given in the table below. The mean 
value is 3.12 and hence gives room for interpretation and some concern. The standard 
deviation is lower than for other clusters, but still large (.751).  
The summarized numbers of the fatigue cluster does not give a clear answer and therefore 
additional analysis was performed, and results are given below the table. 
Total fatigue (the above questions) 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Total Fatigue 339 4 1 5 3,12 ,751 
Valid N (listwise) 339      
Table 19, Fatigue cluster total mean score 
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Other fatigue questions directly related to safety. 
The questions “pilots in this company are often tired at work” & “colleagues are sometimes 
fatigued to a level where flight safety is at risk” have been summed together below and 
received a mean value of 2.43 (reversed scale, low number is negative) which falls in the 
category of concern, or as Reader et al. (2016) puts it “thus indicating urgent action should be 
taken for improvement” (Ibid p.21). The standard deviation indicates a large variation among 
pilot views and both questions are highly subjective in interpretation. One pilot might be 
exhausted while the other is fine, due to external factors like sleep patterns, social problems 
etc. The negative numbers are further illustrated in the graph below the table; this graph 
indicates 63 % consider fatigue to be a direct flight safety problem and only 6.7 % does not 
see fatigue as a problem. 
Fatigue where safety is at risk (Reversed F2 & F5) 
 
N Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Total Fatigue Safety at Risk 339 4 1 5 2,43 ,867 
Valid N (listwise) 339      
Table 20, Fatigue questions directly safety related, reversed mean value 
 
Figure 24, Total fatigue where safety is at risk, (positive answers are negative vs flight safety) 
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4.3 SMS safety culture clusters overall, descriptive statistics and reliability 
This section summarizes the overall results of the four dimensions analyzed above. As 
described the questions were grouped together in four safety culture dimensions (clusters). 
The groups were called Just Culture, Reporting, Fatigue and Perceived Safety Support; the 
clusters were given the notation “Total” to distinguish them from individual questions.  
For some questions the scale were reversed to compensate for negative wording.  
Total safety culture clusters means 
The figure and table below represent the four safety cluster mean values (3.83-4.03), and all 
are considered positive, except for Total Fatigue (3.12) which gives room for interpretations. 
The standard deviation values indicate considerable differences among pilots for all clusters. 
 
Figure 25, Mean scores for all safety clusters 
Descriptive Statistics & reliability 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD alpha 
Total Just Culture 
Cluster 
339 4 1 5 3,86 ,718 0,846 
Total Reporting Cluster 339 4 1 5 4,03 ,683 0,865 
Total Perceived Safety 
Support 
339 4 1 5 3,83 ,747 0,903 
Total Fatigue 339 4 1 5 3,12 ,751 0,751 
Table 21, Safety clusters descriptive statistics and reliability 
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Total safety culture cluster correlations 
The table below show Pearson correlation and indicates significant correlations between the 
safety clusters. It should be noted that the sample size is medium, and the value of this is 
questionable.  
 
Total 
Reporting 
Cluster 
Total Just 
Culture 
Cluster 
Total 
Fatigue 
Total 
Perceived 
Safety 
Support 
Total Reporting 
Cluster 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,846
**
 ,757
**
 ,807
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 339 339 339 339 
Total Just 
Culture Cluster 
Pearson Correlation ,846
**
 1 ,655
**
 ,787
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,000 ,000 
N 339 339 339 339 
Total Fatigue Pearson Correlation ,757
**
 ,655
**
 1 ,699
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  ,000 
N 339 339 339 339 
Total Perceived 
Safety Support 
Pearson Correlation ,807
**
 ,787
**
 ,699
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000  
N 339 339 339 339 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 22, Safety Clusters correlations 
4.4 SMS safety culture clusters versus groups, -in-group differences 
This section analyze in-group differences, i.e. differences between captains and Flight 
Officers, Contract Type, Management Role or not, above/below Age 40 and Company Type 
(Network, LCC, Helicopter). 
The analysis will show spider diagrams where there are differences between groups. Where 
no or small differences are found the graphs are skipped. For all clusters the values are 
displayed according to Pallant (2016) recommendations for Independent-samples t-test (Ibid, 
Loc. 6130) and for ANAOVA (Ibid, Loc. 6439).  
4.4.1 Job title versus safety culture clusters 
The pilot group was reduced to two groups before conducting the analysis, Captains and First 
officers, because many companies use the term second officer the first 1-4 years and 
thereafter first officer even though both are copilots, i.e. “First officers” in the analysis below 
represent both second and first officers; the second officer group was very small (2). 
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Levene’s Test of equality of variance were satisfied for all four clusters, together with high 
Sig. (2-tailed) values this makes it uncertain if there are significant differences between the 
groups, except the Total Fatigue Cluster with p=.016. 
An independent –samples T-Test was conducted to compare the safety clusters scores for 
Captains and First officers. There was no significant difference, except for the Total Fatigue 
Cluster versus Captains and First Officers. Mean, SD, t, p and Cohen’s d are shown below for 
each cluster. 
Means by job title 
 
Figure 26, Captain and FO Mean & SD values versus Safety clusters 
 
Safety culture clusters Mean & SD by job title 
 Captain or FO N Mean SD 
Total Reporting  Captain 195 4,09 ,712 
First or Second Officer 144 3,95 ,636 
Total Just Culture  Captain 195 3,89 ,730 
First or Second Officer 144 3,82 ,702 
Total Fatigue Captain 195 3,21 ,750 
First or Second Officer 144 3,01 ,740 
Total Perceived Safety 
Support 
Captain 195 3,86 ,760 
First or Second Officer 144 3,79 ,730 
Table 23, Safety culture clusters Mean & SD by job title 
Job title versus Total Reporting Cluster 
There were no significant differences in scores between Captains (M=4.09 & SD=.712) and 
First officers (M=3.95 & SD=.636; t(337)=1.774, p=.08, two-tailed ) versus the total reporting 
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cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.133, 99% CI: -.061 to .327) is small 
with Cohen’s d = 0.208. 
 
Figure 27, Total Reporting cluster vs Captains/FO, example of small differences, such graphs are skipped below 
Job title versus Total Just Culture, Perceived and Safety Support 
Since the significant differences were non-existing for all the clusters except Fatigue only the 
values for each cluster will be referred below. Figures would appear as above and in spider 
charts where there are significant differences. 
Just Culture: 
There were no significant differences in scores between Captains (M=3.89 & SD=.730) and 
First officers (M=3.82 & SD=.702; t(337)=.806, p=.41, two-tailed ) versus the Just Culture 
cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.064, 99% CI: -.141 to .268) is very 
small with Cohen’s d = 0.098. 
Perceived Safety Support: 
There were no significant differences in scores between Captains (M=3.86 & SD=.760) and 
First officers (M=3.79 & SD=.730; t(337)=.911, p=.363, two-tailed ) versus the Perceived 
Safety Support cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.075, 99% CI: -.138 
to .287) is very small with Cohen’s d = 0.094. 
Job title versus Total Fatigue Cluster  
There were differences in scores between Captains (M=3.21 & SD=.750) and First officers 
(M=3.01 & SD=.740; t(337)=2.422, p=.016, two-tailed ) versus the Fatigue cluster. The Sig 
(2-tailed) value of 0.016 is below the cutoff value of p=0.05, values below the cutoff is 
considered as a significant difference. However the magnitude of difference in the means 
(MD=.198, 99% CI: -.014 to .411) is small with Cohen’s d = 0.268. 
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Figure 28, Total Fatigue cluster vs Captains/First Officers; both Mean values are below 3.5 
The captain group is scores slightly higher than the first officer group; both groups are below 
the value 3.5 which is considered to be the upper limit for interpretation when using a 1-5 
Likert scale. 
 
Figure 29, The Fatigue clusters versus job titles 
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4.4.2 Contract type versus safety culture clusters 
The contract types were reduced to two groups before conducting the analysis, Typical and 
Atypical, and the other group (N=4) excluded from the analysis. 
Levene’s Test of equality of variance was satisfied for the Fatigue cluster, the other clusters 
did not meet the criteria of equality of variance. All groups came out with low Sig. (2-tailed) 
values (p<0.05) except the Safety Support cluster (p=0.1).   
An independent –samples T-Test was conducted to compare the safety clusters scores for 
those on Typical and Atypical contracts. There were significant differences and Mean, SD, t, 
p and Cohen’s d are shown below for each cluster. 
Mean values by contract type 
 
Figure 30, Safety Clusters Mean scores by Contract type 
Mean scores are lower and standard deviation larger for those with atypical contracts. Both 
groups have the same pattern, with low scores for the total fatigue cluster. SD is larger for 
those on atypical contracts. 
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Safety Clusters Mean & SD by contract type 
 Typical or 
Atypical N Mean SD 
Total Reporting Typical 320 4,06 ,649 
Atypical 15 3,40 1,088 
Total Just Culture Typical 320 3,89 ,675 
Atypical 15 3,17 1,197 
Total Fatigue Typical 320 3,16 ,734 
Atypical 15 2,54 ,931 
Total Perceived Safety Support Typical 320 3,85 ,719 
Atypical 15 3,33 1,131 
Table 24, Safety clusters Mean & SD scores by Contract type 
 
Figure 31, Safety Cluster mean scores versus Contract types (other excluded) 
Contract type versus Total Reporting Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those on Typical (M=4.06 & SD=.649) 
and those on Atypical contracts (M=3.40 & SD=1.088); t(14.471)=2.323, p=.0035, two-
tailed) versus the total reporting cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means 
(MD=.658, 99% CI: -.181 to 1.497) is high with Cohen’s d at 0.760. 
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Figure 32, Total Reporting cluster mean score versus Contract types 
Contract type versus Total Just Culture Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those on Typical (M=3.89 & SD=.675) 
and those on Atypical contracts (M=3.17 & SD=1.197); t(14.420)=2.299, p=.0037, two-
tailed) versus the total Just Culture cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means 
(MD=.716, 99% CI: -.207 to 1,639) is high with Cohen’s d at 0.68. 
 
Figure 33, Total Just Culture cluster mean score versus Contract Types 
Contract type versus Total Perceived Safety Support Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those on Typical (M=3.85 & SD=.719) 
and those on Atypical contracts (M=3.33 & SD=1.131); t(14.536)=1.757, p=.01, two-tailed) 
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versus the total Perceived Safety Support cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means 
(MD=.518, 99% CI: -.354 to 1.391) is high with Cohen’s d at 0.562. 
 
Figure 34, Total Perceived Safety Support mean score versus Contract Types 
Contract type versus Total Fatigue Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those on Typical (M=3,16 & SD=.734) 
and those on Atypical contracts (M=2.54 & SD=0.931); t(333)=3.112, p=.02, two-tailed) 
versus the total Fatigue cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.611, 99% 
CI: -.102 to 1.119) is high with Cohen’s d at 0.745. 
 
Figure 35, Total Fatigue Cluster mean score versus Contract Types 
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The fatigue cluster mean values for both typical and atypical contracted pilots are in the 
caution range, between 2.5 and 3.5. These leaves room for interpretation and is commented 
further in the discussion part. 
4.4.3 Management role versus safety culture clusters 
The management role group was reduced to two groups before conducting the analysis, 
Management Role and Not in Management. 
Levene’s Test of equality of variance was satisfied for all clusters. All groups came out with 
high Sig. (2-tailed) values (p>0.05), indicating the zero hypothesis is valid, i.e. small 
differences between the groups. 
An independent –samples T-Test was conducted to compare the safety clusters scores for 
those with a Management Role and pilots Not in Management. There were no significant 
differences found, and Mean, SD, t, p and Cohen’s d are shown below for each cluster. 
Mean values by Management Role 
 
Figure 36, Safety Clusters Mean & SD scores versus management role 
The management pilots are slightly more negative towards the Total Reporting cluster than 
non-management pilots. In the other clusters none or very small differences were found. Both 
groups display the same pattern, with the Fatigue cluster in the caution range (2.5 to 3.5). 
Mean and SD values are given in the table below. 
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Safety Clusters vs Management Role or Not in Management 
 Management or Not N Mean SD 
Total Reporting Management Role 21 3,90 ,908 
Not in Management 318 4,04 ,667 
Total Just Culture Management Role 21 3,87 ,788 
Not in Management 318 3,86 ,714 
Total Fatigue Management Role 21 3,10 ,857 
Not in Management 318 3,12 ,745 
Total Perceived Safety Support Management Role 21 3,87 ,772 
Not in Management 318 3,83 ,747 
Table 25, Safety Cluster Mean & SD scores versus management role 
Management Role versus Total Reporting Cluster 
There were no significant differences in scores between those with management role (M=3.90 
& SD=.908) and those not in management (M=4.04 & SD=.667); t(337)=-0.863, p=.39, two-
tailed) versus the total reporting cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means 
(MD=.133, 99% CI: -.532 to .266) is very small with Cohen’s d = 0.178. 
Management Role versus Total Just Culture Cluster 
There were no significant differences in scores between those with management role (M=3.87 
& SD=.788) and those not in management (M=3.86 & SD=.714; t(337)=0.043, p=.97, two-
tailed ) versus the total Just Culture cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means 
(MD=.007, 99% CI: -.413 to .426) is very small with Cohen’s d = 0.01 
Management Role versus Total Perceived Safety Support Cluster 
There were no significant differences in scores between those with management role (M=3.87 
& SD=.772) and those not in management (M=3.83 & SD=.747); t(337)=0.241, p=.90, two-
tailed) versus the total Perceived Safety Support cluster. The magnitude of difference in the 
means (MD=.041, 99% CI: -.396 to .477) is very small with Cohen’s d = 0.053. 
Management Role versus Total Fatigue Cluster 
There were no significant differences in scores between those with management role (M=3.10 
& SD=.857) and those not in management (M=3.12 & SD=.745); t(337)=-0.127, p=.81, two-
tailed) versus the total Fatigue cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD= -
.022, 99% CI: -.461 to .417) is very small with Cohen’s d = 0.025. 
4.4.4 Experience level versus safety culture clusters 
Three different groupings where analyzed, Flying Hours, below/above 40 years and 
below/above 30 years of age. All groups displayed significant differences and only the group 
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below/above 40 will be presented with all scores, the other groups are only illustrated with a 
graph displaying mean and standard deviation. 
The Flying Hours group was reduced to two groups before conducting the analysis, Pilots 
with Less than 3000 block hours and those with 3000 or more block hours. Levene’s Test of 
equality of variance was satisfied for any of the safety clusters. All groups came out with high 
Sig. (2-tailed) values (p>0.05) in the independent-samples T-Test, indicating the zero 
hypothesis is valid, i.e. small differences between the groups. (Actually a fourth group where 
analyzed, with a breakpoint at 1000 hours, displaying the same distribution as for 3000 hours. 
No numbers are given for the fourth group). 
The Age grouping (30 years of age as breakpoint) was reduced to two groups, age at or below 
30 and 30+. Levene’s Test of equality of variance was satisfied for the total Just Culture and 
Safety Support clusters, while the Reporting and Fatigue clusters did not assume equality of 
variance. All groups came out with low Sig. (2-tailed) values (p<0.05) in the independent-
samples T-Test, indicating differences between the groups.  
The Age grouping (40 years of age as breakpoint) was reduced to two groups, age at or below 
40 and 40+. Levene’s Test of equality of variance was satisfied for the Perceived Safety 
Support cluster and all other clusters do not assume equal variance. All groups came out with 
low Sig. (2-tailed) values (p<0.05) in the independent-samples T-Test, indicating differences 
between the groups.  
An independent –samples T-Test was conducted to compare the safety clusters scores for 
those at age 40 or below and those at age 40+. There were significant differences found, and 
Mean, SD, t, p and Cohen’s d are shown below for each cluster. In addition the Mean and SD 
is graphically illustrated below for Flying Hours and Age (bp=30) group. 
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Mean values & SD by Flying hours (3000), Age (30) and Age (40), the latter fully 
analyzed. 
 
Figure 37, Safety Cluster Mean & SD versus flying hours 
 
Figure 38, Safety Clusters M & SD scores versus age (30) 
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Figure 39, Safety Clusters Mean & SD scores versus Age (40), fully analysed below 
The age graphs, 30 and 40, display the same differences and the pattern for all three groupings 
are similar, fatigue scores are lower than the other clusters. Mean and standard deviation for 
the Age group is found below (age at or below 40). 
 
Safety Culture Clusters M & SD vs Age(40) 
 Age below 40 or 40+ N Mean SD 
Total Reporting  Below 40 103 3,86 ,743 
40 + 236 4,10 ,643 
Total Just Culture  Below 40 103 3,69 ,794 
40 + 236 3,94 ,670 
Total Fatigue Below 40 103 2,91 ,832 
40 + 236 3,21 ,695 
Total Perceived 
Safety Support 
Below 40 103 3,62 ,806 
40 + 236 3,92 ,702 
Table 26, Safety Culture clusters vs Age (40) 
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Figure 40, Safety Culture clusters Mean scores versus Age, those above 40 generally more positive. 
Age (40) versus Total Reporting Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those at or below 40 years (M=3.86 & 
SD=.743) and those above 40 years (M=4.10 & SD=0.643); t(172)=-2.90, p=.004, two-tailed) 
versus the total reporting cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=-.245, 
99% CI: -.464 to -0,025) is medium with Cohen’s d at 0.346. 
 
Figure 41, Total Reporting cluster versus Age (40) 
Age (40) versus Total Just Culture Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those at or below 40 years (M=3.69 & 
SD=.794) and those above 40 years (M=3.94 & SD=0.670); t(168)=-2.772, p=.006, two-
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tailed) versus the total just culture cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=-
.248, 99% CI: -.482 to -.015) is medium with Cohen’s d at 0.342. 
 
Figure 42, Total Just Culture Cluster mean score vs Age (40) 
Age (40) versus Total Perceived Safety Support Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those at or below 40 years (M=3.62 & 
SD=.806) and those above 40 years (M=3.92 & SD=0.702); t(337)=-3,498, p=.001, two-
tailed) versus the total perceived safety support cluster. The magnitude of difference in the 
means (M= -.304, 99% CI: -.528 to -0.079) is medium with Cohen’s d at 0.398. 
 
Figure 43, Total Perceived Safety Support mean score versus Age (40) 
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Age (40) versus Total Fatigue Cluster 
There were significant differences in scores between those at or below 40 years (M=2.91 & 
SD=.832) and those above 40 years (M=3.21 & SD=0,695); t(167)=-3.209, p=.002, two-
tailed) versus the total fatigue cluster. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.300, 
99% CI: -.544 to -0.056) is medium with Cohen’s d at 0.393. 
The mean values are in the caution range and offer room for interpretation. 
 
Figure 44, Total Fatigue mean score versus Age (40) 
4.4.5 Company type versus safety culture clusters 
ANOVA, Analysis of variance, where performed on the safety culture clusters and the type of 
company, the number of types was reduced to four groups, Network, Low Cost Carriers 
(LCC), Helicopter and other (General aviation, Business etc.). Only the three first are 
commented on in this paper. 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance showed that the total just culture cluster violated the 
test. Welch & Brown-Forsythe test indicated robustness in equality of variance and a post hoc 
test were conducted using Games-Howell for this cluster, for the other clusters no violation 
occurred and a Scheffe post hoc test was executed.  
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Mean and Standard deviation 
 
Figure 45 , Safety Clusters mean & SD scores versus type of Company. 
The general pattern is equal in all groups, with the mean value of the fatigue cluster 
considerable lower for all groups, Network and Helicopter groups are more positive than LCC 
pilots overall. Mean and Standard deviation values are given below. 
Mean & SD for all groups versus safety culture clusters 
 N Mean SD 
Total Reporting Network 242 4,09 ,630 
Low Cost 35 3,28 ,809 
Helicopter 33 4,22 ,582 
Other 29 4,20 ,473 
Total 339 4,03 ,683 
Total Just Culture Network 242 3,94 ,644 
Low Cost 35 3,03 ,890 
Helicopter 33 3,99 ,596 
Other 29 4,06 ,558 
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Total 339 3,86 ,718 
Total Fatigue Network 242 3,12 ,653 
Low Cost 35 2,34 ,796 
Helicopter 33 3,66 ,753 
Other 29 3,50 ,684 
Total 339 3,12 ,751 
Total Perceived 
Safety Support 
Network 242 3,92 ,699 
Low Cost 35 2,99 ,841 
Helicopter 33 4,00 ,584 
Other 29 3,95 ,539 
Total 339 3,83 ,747 
Table 27, Safety Clusters Mean & SD scores versus company type 
The ANOVA test showed between group differences for all groups. 
ANOVA 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Total Reporting  Between Groups 22,904 3 7,635 18,955 ,000 
Within Groups 134,926 335 ,403   
Total 157,830 338    
Total Just Culture  Between Groups 27,012 3 9,004 20,513 ,000 
Within Groups 147,041 335 ,439   
Total 174,052 338    
Total Fatigue Between Groups 35,004 3 11,668 25,114 ,000 
Within Groups 155,640 335 ,465   
Total 190,643 338    
Total Perceived 
Safety Support 
Between Groups 27,809 3 9,270 19,311 ,000 
Within Groups 160,805 335 ,480   
Total 188,614 338    
Table 28, ANOVA figures for Safety Clusters versus Company Type 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dep.Var. 
(I) Type 
of 
company 
reduced 
(J) Type 
of 
company 
reduced 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
99,9% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Total 
Reporting  
Scheffe Network Low Cost ,817
*
 ,115 ,000 ,35 1,29 
Helicopter -,127 ,118 ,761 -,61 ,35 
 Other -,106 ,125 ,868 -,61 ,40 
Low Cost Network -,817
*
 ,115 ,000 -1,29 -,35 
 Helicopter -,945
*
 ,154 ,000 -1,57 -,32 
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Other -,923
*
 ,159 ,000 -1,57 -,27 
 Helicopter Network ,127 ,118 ,761 -,35 ,61 
Low Cost ,945
*
 ,154 ,000 ,32 1,57 
 Other ,021 ,162 ,999 -,64 ,68 
Other Network ,106 ,125 ,868 -,40 ,61 
 Low Cost ,923
*
 ,159 ,000 ,27 1,57 
Helicopter -,021 ,162 ,999 -,68 ,64 
Total Just 
Culture 
Games-
Howell 
Network Low Cost ,905
*
 ,156 ,000 ,26 1,55 
Helicopter -,049 ,112 ,971 -,51 ,41 
Other -,116 ,112 ,726 -,58 ,35 
Low Cost Network -,905
*
 ,156 ,000 -1,55 -,26 
Helicopter -,954
*
 ,183 ,000 -1,68 -,22 
Other -1,021
*
 ,183 ,000 -1,75 -,29 
 Helicopter Network ,049 ,112 ,971 -,41 ,51 
Low Cost ,954
*
 ,183 ,000 ,22 1,68 
 Other -,067 ,147 ,968 -,65 ,52 
Other Network ,116 ,112 ,726 -,35 ,58 
 Low Cost 1,021
*
 ,183 ,000 ,29 1,75 
Helicopter ,067 ,147 ,968 -,52 ,65 
Total 
Fatigue 
Scheffe Network Low Cost ,775
*
 ,123 ,000 ,27 1,28 
Helicopter -,544
*
 ,126 ,000 -1,06 -,03 
Other -,382 ,134 ,045 -,93 ,16 
Low Cost Network -,775
*
 ,123 ,000 -1,28 -,27 
Helicopter -1,319
*
 ,165 ,000 -1,99 -,64 
Other -1,157
*
 ,171 ,000 -1,86 -,46 
 Helicopter Network ,544
*
 ,126 ,000 ,03 1,06 
Low Cost 1,319
*
 ,165 ,000 ,64 1,99 
 Other ,162 ,173 ,833 -,55 ,87 
Other Network ,382 ,134 ,045 -,16 ,93 
 Low Cost 1,157
*
 ,171 ,000 ,46 1,86 
Helicopter -,162 ,173 ,833 -,87 ,55 
Total 
Perceived 
Safety 
Support 
Scheffe Network Low Cost ,926
*
 ,125 ,000 ,41 1,44 
Helicopter -,083 ,129 ,937 -,61 ,44 
Other -,033 ,136 ,996 -,59 ,52 
Low Cost Network -,926
*
 ,125 ,000 -1,44 -,41 
Helicopter -1,008
*
 ,168 ,000 -1,69 -,32 
Other -,959
*
 ,174 ,000 -1,67 -,25 
Helicopter Network ,083 ,129 ,937 -,44 ,61 
Low Cost 1,008
*
 ,168 ,000 ,32 1,69 
 Other ,049 ,176 ,994 -,67 ,77 
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Other Network ,033 ,136 ,996 -,52 ,59 
 Low Cost ,959
*
 ,174 ,000 ,25 1,67 
 Helicopter -,049 ,176 ,994 -,77 ,67 
Table 29, Multiple comparisons of mean scores versus company types 
One way between-groups analysis on the total Reporting cluster 
There were significantly differences (p<0.05) in the three company types, F(3,335)=18.995 at 
p=0.000 for the total Reporting cluster. A Scheffe post hoc showed significant differences 
between LCC (M=3.28 & SD=0.809) and Network (M=4.09 & SD=0.30), and between LCC 
and Helicopter (M=4.22 & SD=.582), the Mean differences where high. The multiple 
comparisons table above show the post hoc numbers. Other comparisons showed no 
significant differences. 
Cohen’s d for Network/LCC = 1.46 and Cohen’s d for LCC/Helicopter= 1.35. Both figures 
are considered a large effect size (larger than SD). 
One way between-groups analysis on the total Just Culture cluster 
There were significantly differences (p<0.05) in the three company types, F(3,335)= 20.513 at 
p=0.000 for the total Just Culture cluster. A Games-Howell post hoc showed significant 
differences between LCC (M=3.03 & SD=0.890) and Network (M=3.94 & SD=0.644), and 
between LCC and Helicopter (M=3.99 & SD=.596), the Mean differences where high (.905 
and .954 respectively). The multiple comparisons table above show the post hoc numbers. 
Other comparisons showed no significant differences, except the “other” group. 
Cohen’s d for Network/LCC = 1.19 and Cohen’s d for LCC/Helicopter= 1.292. Both figures 
are considered a large effect size (actually larger than SD). 
One way between-groups analysis on the total Perceived Safety Support cluster 
There were significantly differences (p<0.05) in the three company types, F(3,335)=19.311 at 
p=0.000 for the total perceived safety support cluster. A Scheffe post hoc showed significant 
differences between LCC (M=2.99 & SD=0.841) and Network (M=3.92 & SD=0.699), and 
between LCC and Helicopter (M=4.00 & SD=.584), the Mean differences where high (MD=-
.926 and MD=-1,008 respectively). The multiple comparisons table above show the post hoc 
numbers. Other comparisons showed no significant differences. 
Cohen’s d for Network/LCC = 1.21 and Cohen’s d for LCC/Helicopter= 1.42. Both figures 
are considered a large effect size (larger than SD). 
One way between-groups analysis on the total Fatigue cluster 
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There were significantly differences (p<0.05) in the three company types, F(3,335)=25.114 at 
p=0.000 for the total Fatigue cluster. A Scheffe post hoc showed significant differences 
between LCC (M=2.34 & SD=0.796) and Network (M=3.12 & SD=0.653), and between LCC 
and Helicopter (M=3.66 & SD=.753), the Mean differences where high (MD= -.775 and 
MD=-1.319 respectively). In addition there were a significant difference between Network 
and Helicopter (MD=0.775 (high)). The multiple comparisons table above show the post hoc 
numbers. Other comparisons showed no significant differences. 
Cohen’s d for Network/LCC = 1.08 and Cohen’s d for LCC/Helicopter= 1.70(!). Both figures 
are considered a large effect size (larger than SD).  
The effect size for Network/Helicopter; Cohen’s d= 0.768, and this in the high range.  
Noteworthy is the mean value for LCC at 2.34 calling for immediate attention according to 
Reader et al. (2016). The Network value (3.12) is in the middle of the caution range (2.5 to 
3.5). 
None of the groups were guaranteed at type 1 error level, and the harmonic mean of the group 
was used. 
The spider diagram illustrates mean differences between all groups and clusters. Note the 
difference between Network and Helicopter vs the total Fatigue cluster.  
 
Figure 46, Mean scores differences for all Safety Culture clusters versus Company types 
Below you will find graphs illustrating the differences cluster by cluster 
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Figure 47, Reporting cluster mean scores versus company type 
 
Figure 48, Just Culture cluster mean scores versus Company type 
 
Figure 49, Perceived Safety Support cluster mean scores versus Company type 
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Figure 50, Fatigue cluster mean scores versus Company type 
4.5 Other results describing the research question 
4.5.1 CAA/EASA findings 
Pilots knowledge of essential SMS features, like reporting, at the state level where tested. The 
results are given below; only 54 % answered either yes or no indicating they are familiar with 
the CAA Safety Management System. Almost 46 % replied they did not know. Information 
and reporting is an essential part of an effective Safety Management System and this result is 
discussed in section 5 of this paper. Nmissing = 1, indicating 99,7% response rate. 
 
Is there a voluntary pilot reporting system in the country (CAA) 
where your company's AOC is registered? 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 173 51,0 51,2 51,2 
No 10 2,9 3,0 54,1 
I don't 
know 
155 45,7 45,9 100,0 
Total 338 99,7 100,0  
Missing System 1 ,3   
Total 339 100,0   
Table 30, Pilot’s knowledge about state level SMS features 
Pilots were asked if they considered EASA or national CAA to be politically governed to a 
degree that flight safety is jeopardized. The response rate was 99.7 % or Nmissing =1 and the 
full range (1-5) of the scale were used. The mean value was high 4.06 or if reversed for 
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consistency, the mean was 1.94(!). Low numbers indicates a concern or urgent action is 
needed. The standard deviation was high indicating a considerable variation among pilots.  
To check if there were differences between groups, independent-samples T-Tests were run on 
age, contract, position, previous contract and management role groups. Only the “position” 
group showed a slight chance of differences. No other significant differences between groups 
were disclosed. 
The table below shows the mean and standard deviation:  
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
The national aviation safety 
authorities (CAA/EASA) are 
politically governed to a degree 
that flight safety is jeopardized. 
338 4 1 5 4,06 1,031 
Valid N (listwise) 338      
Reversing the response for consistency, low numbers are negative vs flight safety 
Above question reversed 338 4 1 5 1,94 1,031 
Valid N (listwise) 338      
Table 31, Are CAA/EASA organizations politically influenced to a degree were flight safety is at risk? 
To clarify the nationality of the organization the pilots was thinking of in the question above a 
follow up question were asked. The options were national CAA and EASA at the European 
Union level. The chart below shows Nordic Countries and EASA distribution, other valid 
countries is grouped within “other”. The chart only reflects the count rate, and is not 
compared to the nationality of the pilots. (Nmissing =12 and Nvalid = 327). 
 
Figure 51, Political governance versus Organization referred, percentage of total count 
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Norway and EASA stands out with 35% and 38% respectively, but the low response rate from 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland compared to Norway render the national numbers skewed and 
should be viewed together with the cross tabulation below.  
Calculating the percentage of respondents thinking of their national CAA or EASA 
respectively (using the cross tabulation below) gives these numbers: 
Norway:  CAANOR 61.8%  EASA 30.6 % 
Sweden: CAASWE 40.9 %  EASA 40.9 % 
Denmark: CAADEN 18 %  EASA 57.4 % 
Finland:  CAAFIN 57.7 %  EASA 42.3 % 
At the “positive” end we have Danish CAA with 18 % of Danish based pilots viewing their 
national CAA politically governed to a degree where flight safety is jeopardized. On the 
negative side we have Norway with a huge mistrust towards the national CAA and political 
governance, 61.8 %. The political governance (EU) of EASA is substantial and higher among 
EU countries (Sweden, Denmark, and Finland) than Norway which is an EASA member but 
not a member of the EU. 
(The column named “Other Countries” (N=37) is dominated to 81% by the Irish CAA). 
The table below shows a cross tabulation of the figures referred above: 
 
 
What country are you based in? * Nordic Countries Cross tabulation 
Count 
 
CAA Nordic Countries and EASA 
Total Denmark Norway Sweden EASA Finland 
Other 
Countries 
What 
country 
are you 
based 
in? 
Denmark 11 0 3 35 0 12 61 
Norway 0 115 0 57 0 14 186 
Sweden 1 0 18 18 0 7 44 
Belgium 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Finland 0 0 0 11 15 0 26 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
UK 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Other 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Total 13 115 21 125 16 37 327 
Table 32, “Base” country cross tabulated with Nordic countries and EASA 
Table 33, Cross tabulation of base and CAA/EASA, count. 
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4.5.2 Employment models 
Employment models vs Flight safety (Misc3) 
The question received a very low mean score M=1.62 and N=337. The standard deviation 
showed a considerable difference among pilots and 85% of the pilots believe the contract type 
affect flight safety. The skewness in the employment contract group is probably reflected in 
the question responses.  
Independent-samples T-Tests were conducted on the age, contract type, position, previous 
contract and management groups to check for differences. Age and position showed 
differences, both groups not satisfying the equal variance assumption.  
The pilots with a age below 40 (M=1.4, SD=.884) showed a difference to those with age 
above 40 (M=1.71, SD=1.286); t(17)=2.251, p=.001, two-tailed) versus the employment 
models and flight safety question. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.316, 99% 
CI: -.555 to -.77) is considered high with Cohen’s d at 0.63. 
The Captains (M=1.74, SD=1.256) showed a difference to Flight Officers (M=1.44, 
SD=1.062); t(9)=2.366, p=.0019, two-tailed) versus the employment models and flight safety 
question. The magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.300, 99% CI: .051 to .549) is low 
with Cohen’s d at 0.27. 
Both t-tests show younger pilots and pilots holding flight officer positions to be more negative 
towards flight safety and employment models. 
Misc3 Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
Pilot employment models do not affect 
flight safety. 
337 4 1 5 1,62 1,187 
Valid N (listwise) 337      
Table 34, Do Employment models affect Flight Safety? 
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Figure 52, Does pilot employment models affect flight safety? (Red = negative effect) 
The above findings is consistent with the findings towards the below question, but the 
skewness among the respondents is probably reflected, i.e. biased towards own type of 
contract.  
To check if the pilot group was more positive towards atypical or typical employment models 
in the question above an additional question was asked based on what contract the pilots 
currently had, i.e. those on typical contract was asked question R4T and those on atypical 
contract R4P. Both groups indicate a more negative attitude towards atypical employment 
models. The full range (1-6) was used (the range had a possibility to not participate, “No 
answer”). R4P received 18 responses with 72% in favor of a typical contract when it comes to 
enhanced flight safety, likewise the R4T received 320 responses and with 75% favoring a 
typical contract. Nmissing =1. The question was not further analyzed. 
In the table below Mean and Standard Deviation is given, graphical illustrations are found 
below the table. 
R4T/R4P: Flight Safety vs Employment models Descriptive Statistics 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
R4T: Employment models versus 
flight safety in Europe.: Temporary 
Employment models 
338 
(18) 
5 1 6 1,43 ,670 
R4P: Employment models versus 
flight safety in Europe.: Permanent 
Employment model (unlimited) 
339 
(320) 
5 1 6 4,63 ,647 
Valid N (listwise) 338      
Table 35, Flight safety versus employment models 
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Figure 53, Temporary employment versus flight safety, red negative effect 
 
Figure 54, Typical employment versus flight safety, green positive effect 
Self-reporting vs previous contract evaluation 
To get a better picture of the self-reporting willingness versus employment models, those with 
less than 5 years at current employer were asked additional questions about their views on 
self-reporting, among other issues. 70 respondents were asked the question and Nmissing=3. 
Pilots with a previous typical employment contract (NprevTyp=28) were more neutral, i.e. 
reported no change from previous employer. Pilots with a previous atypical employment 
model (NprevAtyp=34) were much more negative to self-reporting when on an atypical contract. 
The table below shows the cross tabulation and frequency. The figures are graphically 
illustrated below the table. No further analysis was performed on this question. 
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You have changed employer the last 5 years; With your PREVIOUS employer, how 
would you rate the following criteria? 
 
Self-reporting 
Much 
harder / 
Much less 
Harder 
/ Less 
No 
change 
Easier / 
more 
Much easier / 
much more 
Count Count Count Count Count 
 Previous Typical 1 7 14 3 3 
Previous Atypical 11 14 7 2 0 
Other (no previous etc.) 0 1 1 1 1 
Table 36, Previous employer contract versus Self-Reporting. 
 
Figure 55, “Atypical” previous employer contract versus Self-reporting 
 
Figure 56, “Typical” previous contract versus Self-Reporting 
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Stepping down from duty due to fatigue vs Employment models 
Pilots were asked different questions depending on their current employment contract (typical 
or atypical) versus their willingness to step down from duty due to fatigue. (The pilots have a 
right and obligation to step down from duty when fatigued). The pilots were asked different 
questions depending on their contract type, unfortunately the wording is not equal, one group 
were asked a negatively worded question while the other were asked a positively worded 
question. This might cause bias towards one employment contract type. However the results 
are unambiguous when looking at the mean scores. Those on Atypical contracts believe it is 
easier to step down from fatigue when on a typical contract M=3.89 & SD .875, vice versa 
those on typical contract believe it is harder to step down from duty due to fatigue when on an 
atypical contract (M=4,57 & SD=.735). To have a consistent look versus flight safety the 
latter group was reversed and the comparable mean value is very low (M=1.43).  
Independent-samples T-Tests were performed on age, position, management role and 
previous contract type groups. The previous contract type was so small that the test contained 
only N=9 (the question was already divided in contract type groups) and hence discarded. The 
position group and management role group showed small or no significant differences.  
The age group (below/above 40) showed significant differences even though the means were 
extremely low for both. The pilots with a age below 40 (N=95, M=1.6, SD=.892) showed a 
difference to those with age above 40 (N=225, M=1.36, SD=0.647); t(11.6)=2.372, p=.019, 
two-tailed) versus the willingness to step down from fatigue versus the contract type. The 
magnitude of difference in the means (MD=.240, 99% CI: .04 to -.44) is medium with 
Cohen’s d at 0,312. In short older pilots were more skeptical towards atypical contracts and 
the willingness to step down from duty. 
Employment models vs Stepping down from duty due to fatigue. 
 N Range Min. Max. Mean SD 
F6P: If I had a permanent (unlimited) 
employment contract it would be easier to 
step down from duty, when fatigued. 
19 3 2 5 3,89 ,875 
F6T: If I was employed through a 
temporary contract it would be harder to 
step down from duty, when fatigued. 
320 4 1 5 4,57 ,735 
Valid N (listwise) 339      
Question F6T reversed for consistency vs 
flight safety, (due negative wording) 
320 4 1 5 1,43 ,735 
Table 37, Employment models versus stepping down from duty due to fatigue 
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Figure 57, F6P graphically illustrated, 68.5% in favor of typically employment 
 
Figure 58, F6T graphically illustrated, 94% negatively biased if atypically employed 
4.5.3 Miscellaneous 
The questionnaire had two open ended questions one specific and one open to comment on 
the questionnaire and other issues, the latter is deleted from this paper. The first question 
asked what the respondents viewed as the “Greatest threat to European aviation”. The 
response text is compromising for some, revealing company names etc. therefore the full text 
is not shown in this report. The answers were evaluated one by one and categorized as 
greatest threat (N=309) and second greatest threat (N=119) to European Aviation; -two new 
variables were established for this purpose. A few participants contributed with a third threat, 
but this is not reflected in this report. 
Top three threats listed by the respondents as greatest or second greatest are identical; the 
frequency tables below show the ranked lists of threats. Employment models, fatigue and 
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political governing of CAA are ranked as top three threats and in that order. Remarkably, only 
two respondents mention terrorist acts as the greatest threat to European Aviation. Political 
governing have a frequency 20 times higher, and fatigue 45 times higher and employment 
models rise to 50 times greater threat to aviation than terrorist acts. None mentioned terrorist 
acts as a secondary threat to aviation. 
Greatest threat to European Aviation, ranked high-low. 
 Frequency Percent Valid % Cumulative % 
Valid Employment models 99 29,2 32,0 32,0 
Fatigue 90 26,5 29,1 61,2 
Political governing of 
CAA/deregulation/respons
ibility fragmentation 
41 12,1 13,3 74,4 
Low Cost Carrier 
Regime/Race to the 
bottom 
32 9,4 10,4 84,8 
Economical pressure 20 5,9 6,5 91,3 
Operator Management 
pressure 
7 2,1 2,3 93,5 
Training standards/Manual 
flying skills 
6 1,8 1,9 95,5 
Other 6 1,8 1,9 97,4 
Low Pilot Experience 4 1,2 1,3 98,7 
Lack of social security 2 ,6 ,6 99,4 
Terror/Criminal act 2 ,6 ,6 100,0 
Total 309 91,2 100,0  
Missing System 30 8,8   
Total 339 100,0   
Table 38, Threat to European Aviation ranked high to low, extracted from open ended text. 
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Figure 59, Threats to European aviation ranked, extracted from open ended text 
“Secondary” threats to European aviation 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Employment models 40 11,8 33,6 33,6 
Fatigue 27 8,0 22,7 56,3 
Political governing of 
CAA/deregulation/responsi
bility fragmentation 
14 4,1 11,8 68,1 
Training standards/Manual 
flying skills 
10 2,9 8,4 76,5 
Economical pressure 7 2,1 5,9 82,4 
Other 7 2,1 5,9 88,2 
Low Cost Carrier 
Regime/Race to the bottom 
5 1,5 4,2 92,4 
Operator Management 
pressure 
4 1,2 3,4 95,8 
Low Pilot Experience 3 ,9 2,5 98,3 
Lack of social security 2 ,6 1,7 100,0 
Total 119 35,1 100,0  
Missing System 220 64,9   
Total 339 100,0   
Table 39, “Secondary/additional” listed threat (ranked high to low) 
The “Other” category above hide to a large extent a Norwegian helicopter issue called HOFO, 
see abbreviations. 
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Figure 60, “Secondary/additional” listed threat (ranked high to low), terror not mentioned 
Luck vs flight safety 
A report from New Zeeland (Gill and Shergill, 2004, Abstract and section 4.1) reported a high 
number of pilots to consider luck a major part of flight safety, to evaluate this among Nordic 
pilots a question confronting the matter were issued. The result was positive and “only” 9% 
considered luck a main factor towards flight safety.  
 
Figure 61, Percentage of pilots considering luck a main safety factor in their company 
95 
 
Independent-samples T-Tests were conducted on the age, contract type, position, previous 
contract and management groups to check for differences. Age and Contract type showed 
differences, both groups not satisfying the equal variance assumption.  
The pilots with an age below 40 (N=103, M=3.98, SD=1.24) showed a difference to those 
with age above 40 (N=243, M=4.40, SD=0.913); t(12.5)=-3.088, p=.002, two-tailed) versus 
luck as a safety factor (high M value is positive regarding flight safety). The magnitude of 
difference in the means (MD=.421, 99% CI: -.691 to -.152) is medium with Cohen’s d at 
0.389. Young pilots considered luck to be a greater factor. 
The pilots with a typical contract (M=4.32, SD=.994) showed a difference to those on an 
atypical contract (M=3.20, SD=1.5521); t(9)=2.817, p=.013, two-tailed) versus luck as a 
safety factor (high M value is positive regarding flight safety). The magnitude of difference in 
the means (MD=1.118, 99% CI: .270 to 1.985) is high with Cohen’s d at 0.891. Atypically 
employed pilots considered luck a greater factor towards flight safety. 
ANOVA, Analysis of variance, where performed on the question of luck and the type of 
company, the number of types was reduced to four groups, Network, Low Cost Carriers 
(LCC), Helicopter and other (General aviation, Business etc.). Only the three first are 
commented on in this paper. 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance showed no violation occurred and a Scheffe post 
hoc test was performed on all groups.  
One way between-groups analysis on the total Reporting cluster: 
There were significantly differences (p<0.05) in the three company types, F(3,333)=15.15 at 
p=0.000 for the question of luck and flight safety. A Scheffe post hoc showed significant 
differences between LCC (M=3.23 & SD=1.285) and Network (M=4.37 & SD=0.946), and 
between LCC and Helicopter (M=4.58 & SD=.83), the Mean differences where high (MD 
LCC/Network=1.142 and LCC/Helicopter=1.347). 
Cohen’s d for Network/LCC = 1.02 and Cohen’s d for LCC/Helicopter= 1.27. Both figures 
are considered a large effect size (larger than SD). Luck was considered a greater factor in 
LCC operations than for network and helicopter operations. 
Only the Multiple Comparisons table from the ANOVA is shown below. 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   Luck   
Scheffe   
(I) Type of 
company 
reduced 
(J) Type of 
company 
reduced MD (I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
99,9% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Network Low Cost 1,142
*
 ,178 ,000 ,42 1,87 
Helicopter -,205 ,182 ,738 -,95 ,54 
Other -,008 ,193 1,000 -,80 ,78 
LCC Network -1,142
*
 ,178 ,000 -1,87 -,42 
Helicopter -1,347
*
 ,238 ,000 -2,32 -,38 
Other -1,151
*
 ,247 ,000 -2,16 -,14 
Helicopter Network ,205 ,182 ,738 -,54 ,95 
Low Cost 1,347
*
 ,238 ,000 ,38 2,32 
Other ,196 ,250 ,892 -,82 1,22 
Other Network ,008 ,193 1,000 -,78 ,80 
Low Cost 1,151
*
 ,247 ,000 ,14 2,16 
Helicopter -,196 ,250 ,892 -1,22 ,82 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.001 level. 
Table 40, Luck and flight safety versus company type comparison 
 
Figure 62, Luck and flight safety versus company type, lower number is more negative towards safety 
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5 Discussion; Essences and Analysis 
The theoretical background of SMS effectiveness and possible in-group differences where 
summed up in two hypotheses, referred below. This discussion will focus on both positive and 
negative effects on SMS effectiveness and the ability to retain effectiveness. Please refer to 
the theoretical background of SMS, Employment models and the research question described 
in chapter 1 and 2. Headlines in each section below refer the objectives listed in sections 1.2. 
 Hypothesis 1: The SMS system need to have the characters of mutual “just culture”, 
openness, trust and support to receive reports, in addition the systems need channels and 
flexibility to promote the information to the sharp-end in a trustworthy manner. If any of 
these factors are violated from the management the pilots will not self-report and the 
safety management system will lose effectiveness. 
 Hypothesis 2: Differences within contract types, age groups, experience level, position 
and roles and the type of company will show differences towards self-reporting 
willingness, perceived safety support, fatigue issues and just culture, and hence indicate 
differences towards the possibility to retain SMS effectiveness. 
A key point is the five forces of an effective safety reporting environment and to recapitulate 
these are given below: 
 
Figure 63, Recap of the five basic characteristics of "effective safety reporting" (ICAO, 2013, p. 2-17) 
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5.1 Empirical findings versus the four safety dimensions 
One of the main objectives was to check if the LSE safety culture survey dimension of 
perceived safety support, fatigue, reporting and just culture could be verified among Nordic 
pilots. The cultural characteristics (low hieratical gradient, culture of speaking up and strong 
labor regulations(Tear et al., 2016)) and strong union employer cooperation made it plausible 
to expect an equal or better score in this survey, especially on just culture and perceived safety 
support. The number of questions in each dimension is far less and hence not directly 
comparable but a good indication. 
 
Figure 64, LSE versus this survey, safety clusters (Reader et al., 2016) 
As shown above this survey have higher mean values than in the LSE survey. The remarkable 
difference is perceived safety support which scores considerably higher, this cluster contained 
considerable less and less diverse questions than in the LSE survey, this might be a reason, 
but equally so the Nordic cultural traditions (Tear et al., 2016) mentioned might be another 
reason for this gap. Moving away from these traditions might alter the picture in the future. 
All scores in this survey are above the cutoff value of 3.5, except for the fatigue cluster (3.12), 
which gives room for interpretation, -more about fatigue later. 
Overall the mean values in this survey are considered good and positive towards hypothesis 1. 
This indicates a good safety culture environment among Nordic operators and their pilots and 
should be regarded as a validation of the conclusion in the LSE survey:  
The results show that the overall pilots’ perception of safety culture is generally 
positive. (Reader et al., 2016, p. 148) 
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Another main objective was to evaluate if the Safety Management System can retain 
effectiveness in the changing pilot environment. Based on the overall scores there are only 
one concern, or crack in the SMS fundament, -fatigue. Ref. Hypothesis 1, i.e. reporting 
willingness of fatigue matters are lacking as an input to the SMS, and hence indirectly lack of 
perceived safety support since it is not handled by the authorities and in this respect render the 
Safety Management System less efficient than needed. 
5.1.1 Nordic pilot groups vs the safety culture, -a more diverged picture 
The Nordic pilot group were categorized in these groups to show differences and to detect 
possible pitfalls toward SMS effectiveness: 
 Title;    Captains & Flight Officers 
 Contract type;  Typical & Atypical 
 Management role; Management & Non-Management 
 Experience level; Above 40 years & Below 40 years of age 
 Company type; Network, Low Cost & Helicopter 
Title, Contract type, Management role and Experience 
The first group, title, shows difference between captains and first officers only when 
comparing scores in the fatigue cluster, but with a small effect size (0.268). The next 
categorization, contract type, was skewed but showed differences in all clusters and with high 
effect size (0.562 to 0.760). Managers showed no differences towards the clusters. The age 
division showed medium differences, effect size 0.342 to 0.393 in all clusters. This indicates, 
in line with the LSE survey, that younger, less experienced copilots are more negative 
towards the safety culture clusters. In addition this survey and the LSE survey found a higher 
percentage of these pilots holding an atypical contract (Reader et al., 2016, p. 117).  
Contract type differences indicate a shift in aviation safety thinking and support hypothesis 2 
in the suggestion of a possible shift in SMS effectiveness, but require supplementary studies, 
see recommendations.  
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Company type  
 
Figure 65, Differences illustrated by mean scores vs company type, discussed below. 
More interesting and distinct were the findings between company types, Network, Low Cost 
Carriers (LCC) and the Helicopter segment. Overall the Helicopter segment is by far the most 
positive, even the fatigue cluster are in the “good” range (M=3.66). (Please note almost all of 
the helicopter pilots were based in Norway and hence generalization outside this segment is 
doubtful). 
The LCC segment scores in the caution range or below in all clusters, while the network 
segment falls in the caution range in the concerning fatigue cluster only. The difference 
between the groups, LCC/Network, is high, actually the effect size is larger than the standard 
deviation in all clusters (1.3 to 1.7), and fatigue is again the most concerning. 
Noteworthy is the mean value for LCC and the fatigue cluster at 2.34 calling for immediate 
attention. The Network value is in the middle of the caution range (3.12 versus 2.5 to 3.5). 
This and the Ghent university survey found Low Cost Carriers to have the far more pilots on 
atypical contracts than network companies (Jorens et al., 2015, p. 160-161).  
The indications that younger, less experienced have a higher degree of atypical contracts 
together with the shift towards LCC in Europe, and their higher use of atypical contracts, and 
concerning safety culture scores show a concerning picture towards hypothesis 2. It is safe to 
assume the shift described will affect the effectiveness of the Safety Management System 
negatively.  
5.2 SMS effectiveness; -Respondent’s knowledge of own company SMS 
The effectiveness of a Safety Management System is dependent on the knowledge of the SMS 
and the potential for learning and the perceived information flow. To check this knowledge 
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additional question were asked and a positive high percentage (high 80’s) had knowledge of 
the company’s safety management system. Equal numbers were found versus reporting 
systems (mandatory, voluntary, confidential) in their company.  
Pilots prioritizing of the main focus areas, in their safety organization, put “Human factors” 
and “Pilot Procedural errors” first and “Latent Errors” within the organization after the two 
mentioned categories. This is contradictory to one of the reasons to implement a Safety 
Management System; - to detect latent errors.  
The respondents were also asked to prioritize the objectives of their reporting system, 
(Learning, Put blame, Trend analysis, Fulfil obligations towards regulators). A clear positive 
result towards SMS effectiveness were received, learning, trend analysis, fulfil obligations, 
other and then to put blame.  
Only small in-group differences were noted in both questions. 
To remain effective the SMS must have a clear policy of just culture and willingness to learn, 
this was verified by the response and hence a positive response versus hypothesis 1. There is 
no reason, based on these items, to believe that SMS efficiency is reduced, even though latent 
errors were prioritized lower than desired, but the differences were very small. 
5.3 Other findings relevant to assess the effectiveness of the SMS, 
5.3.1 The Nordic pilot group versus employment models 
Pilot employment models versus flight safety were tested, and the disturbing mean value of 
1.6, shows an unambiguous response in favor of typical employment models. It should be 
noted that the pilot group is skewed and probably biased towards own contract type. A less 
skewed category (previous employment contract) showed the pilots preferred a typical 
employment model towards the willingness to self-report. In addition the question of 
willingness to step down from duty due to fatigue favored typical contracts. 
The above might indicate a reason to dig into this matter in further studies, and it is negative 
in respect to hypothesis 2, and hence SMS efficiency of just culture and reporting willingness 
is reduced. 
5.3.2 The Nordic pilot group versus safety/fatigue reports 
The mandatory issue of Fatigue reporting shows disappointing results. Approximately 65% of 
the total pilot group had skipped one or more fatigue reports the last 12 months, even those in 
management skip these reports at the same level. There might be reasons to do so, ease of 
reporting, fatigue itself and of course if there is lack of support or action on such reports from 
102 
 
the companies. This render the Safety Management System less effective (both hypothesis 1 
& 2 is negative) than necessary versus fatigue issues and hence flight safety. 
Pilot quote open ended question number 54:  
“My company officially claims to practice non punitive reporting. I was ordered to my chief 
pilot because they said I filed too many fatigue reports according to our head of flight crew 
and head of flight operations. They threatened to take me off (xxxxx deleted text) operations. 
Officially our head of flight operations ask us to file reports and says that (XXXX company 
deleted) should be a learning organization. The reality however show that they punish and 
threatened those who does, me included. 
As I’m not want to jeopardize my employment I stopped filing reports after this clear 
management message they send me!” 
5.3.3 The Nordic pilot group versus threats in aviation 
Another possible biased question, due to the fact respondents have a high degree of typical 
employment, is; -What is the greatest threat to European aviation? 
1. Employment models 
2. Fatigue 
3. Political governance of CAA/regulations etc. 
…… 
11. Terrorist act (only 2 listed this at all) 
This order (first three listed) was repeated when listing the second greatest threat to aviation 
in Europe. Even if biased when it comes to employment models, the disturbing fact remains; -
the three greatest threats are not considered criminal act, but regulations itself and problems 
regulating the issues of employment and fatigue. Only the regulators may alter all of the first 
three listed threats, this aggregates the negative picture. If we sum up the three first into one 
“regulator as a threat group” a depressing 74.4 percent list this as the greatest threat to 
European aviation. 91 percent of the respondents answered this question. This question raises 
considerable concern towards the regulating authorities and their “SMS effectiveness”. The 
companies on the other hand are believed to follow the path laid by the regulators to stay 
competitive and have little choice in that respect, i.e. stricter internal company rules than 
required by the authorities will increase costs and reduce competiveness.  
No in-group differences were tested and the question is not evaluated towards the main 
hypothesizes. 
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5.4 Does the Nordic pilot group have information and knowledge of national CAA 
reporting systems and confidence in CAA?  
54% have knowledge of CAA reporting systems and 46% of the pilots don’t know if such 
systems exist. This shows an information problem within national CAA and hence a reduced 
learning potential and possibility to evaluate what is going on effectively at a state level. If we 
in addition recall the fact that the mean value of 1.94 was registered for the question of 
political governance of national CAA to a degree were safety is jeopardized, then this add up 
to a huge mistrust towards the CAA/EASA possibility to rule in a safe manner.  This result 
was not evaluated towards the main hypothesizes. 
6 Conclusion, Recommendations and words of caution 
6.1 How does the pilot employment environment affect SMS effectiveness? 
The overall picture when looking at mean scores for all safety clusters is good, except the 
fatigue cluster. Fatigue calls for attention with a mean score of 3.12. Individual scores within 
the cluster and the fact that a vast majority think safety is at risk (M = 2.43) because of 
fatigue, together with high a mandatory fatigue report skip rate it is safe to assume that the 
SMS lack effectiveness in the fatigue area and indirectly reporting willingness in this respect. 
There are clear indications of differences among pilots employed in different company types 
(Network versus Low Cost Carriers versus Helicopter) within all safety dimensions analyzed: 
 
There are indications that LCC have a greater SMS effectiveness problem than Network 
carriers and especially Helicopter operators. LCC have less perceived safety support, less 
perceived feeling of just culture, less reporting willingness and a higher fatigue issue. This 
picture is aggregated by the fact that LCC use a higher degree of atypical employment models 
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and younger (less experienced) pilots to a higher degree (Jorens et al., 2015), both these 
groups are more negative towards the safety dimensions analyzed. The legacy carriers are 
shifting towards LCC operations and moving towards the LCC employment regime (Ibid), i.e. 
lowering cost by outsourcing operations to LCC, and this shifting pilot environment makes it 
plausible to assume a shift in the efficiency of the SMS among network carriers too.  
Overall the survey validated the LSE findings (Reader et al., 2016, p. 148), hence fulfilled one 
of the main goals of research; replication and hence validation of results (Marczyk et al., 
2005, Loc. 417), making the findings more plausible. 
The cumulonimbus clouds in European aviation might be embedded or obscured, but partly 
disclosed by this and other surveys, like the LSE and Ghent surveys (Reader et al., 2016, 
Jorens et al., 2015). All pointing to fatigue, employment models and regulation as areas of 
great concern, this will if unaddressed probably render the companies and national Safety 
Management Systems less efficient in the long run, because of widespread mistrust, fear of 
retaliations and failure to give safety support.  
SMS safety pillars, reporting, just culture, perceived safety support and the interwoven fatigue 
issue are under pressure, due to the shifting pilot environment towards unsecure job contracts 
and legislation uncertainty it might even crack. Countermeasures to rebuild a cracked, but not 
collapsed, SMS fundament seem appropriate. 
The mistrust among pilots towards political governance of EASA/CAA is so pronounced that 
it is almost unbelievable (M = 1.94, 74.5% of commercial pilots states safety is jeopardized 
by political governance of CAA/EASA), and should be of great concern both for companies 
and governing regulators. Based on ICAO’s words of an effective safety organization (safety 
information, learning and willingness to report etc. see citation below (ICAO, 2013)) the 
conclusion must be; a failure by EASA/National CAA to embed a safety culture at all levels.  
This study found a clear  favor of typical employment contracts and favor of legacy carrier 
models, additionally it seems younger and less experienced pilots are more negative, or if you 
like; -the future of European aviation, the last line of defense, is less positive towards the 
safety culture evolution seen in Europe. 
6.2 Recommendations 
 In future surveys adjust the pilot demographics of contract types to clarify if pilots are 
employed directly by the AOC holder (i.e. employed directly where the SMS 
organization is responsible/accountable) or through work agencies, third, fourth, fifth 
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parties etc., this will give a better understanding of the real differences between pilot 
groups, reduce skewness and probably enhanced validity. 
 The huge mistrust towards political governance of regulators and the regulators 
themselves, as disclosed in this survey, needs to be studied.  
 Urgent action is needed to validate the findings in this survey towards fatigue. This 
survey discloses the area of fatigue among pilots to be of great concern towards flight 
safety in Europe. Fatigue must be addressed and action taken in Europe; US FAA did 
take actions after numerous catastrophic accidents related to fatigue (Sumwalt, 2008), 
the evidence of the fatigue problem is widely documented (Roach et al., 2012, Goode, 
2003, Honn et al., 2016, Caldwell, 2005, Caldwell, 2001, Hartzler, 2014, Maruff et al., 
2005) and lives do not need to be wasted before this issue is addressed in Europe. This 
and other surveys together with ICAO’s words, do put a huge responsibility on 
politicians, regulators and operators in this respect (please substitute the word 
management below with the three listed if the “chain of command” is hard to grasp).  
“The ultimate responsibility for the establishment and adherence to sound 
safety practices rests with the management of the organization. A safety culture 
cannot be effective unless it is embedded within an organization’s own 
culture.” 
(ICAO, 2013, p 2-10) 
 EASA is recommended to conduct pilot safety culture surveys regularly;  
o To improve trust and perceived cooperation between the blunt and sharp end of 
European aviation.  
o To get a better picture of embedded safety issues in the ever changing 
environment of aviation. 
o To enable direct information channels with the sharp end.  
o To improve the SMS efficiency at the regulator level. 
o Pilots should be a part of the design group to pin-point problem areas at a 
larger degree.  
6.3 Words of caution and contemplation: 
"It is unknown whether ‘fear’ of reporting is widespread. There is anecdotal 
evidence that in companies and organisations that have an authoritarian 
approach to health and safety widespread fear exists. There is a need to:  
• Measure fear across a range of industries. 
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• Measure the impact of fear.  
• Gather data in a way that is not threatening to the people and 
organisations involved. 
It is a gloomy prediction that fear may be endemic or will become endemic in 
occupational safety. To make the case that fear exists, risks erroneously 
undermining the credibility of H& S management. To make the case that fear 
does not exist risks leaving a potential threat to the effectiveness of H& S 
unaddressed" (Townsend, 2013, Loc 1346 (Kindle version)). 
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APPENDICES 
1. Survey questions with alternatives and logic  
*   Equal to the LSE Pilot Safety Culture Survey 
**   Almost equal to LSE Safety Culture Survey, small clarification. 
“xx_other”  SPSS ID for questions having an “Other” option. 
N, O, S Nominal, Ordinal, Scale, SPSS measurement level 
Q. 
No. 
SPSS 
ID 
SPSS 
level 
Question text Response Alternatives 
1 DP1* 
DP1_other* 
N 
N 
What country are you based 
in? 
Drop down menu of participating countries: 
UK, Germany..etc 
2 DP2* 
DP2_other* 
N 
N 
What is your nationality? Drop down menu of nationalities:  
British, German, French, etc. 
3 DP3* N What is your age? Drop down (DD):  
18-30, 31-40, 41-50, 51-60, 60+ 
4 DP4* N What company do you 
mainly fly for (Nordic 
Airlines listed first)? 
Drop down list of Airlines in Europe + 
Other.  
Question deleted in report 
5 DP5* 
DP5_other* 
N 
N 
What type of company do 
you work for? 
DD: Network, low cost, charter/leisure, 
cargo, aereal 
work/ambulance/surveillance, 
helicopter, business/General Aviation, 
Other (pls state) 
6 DP6* 
DP6_Other* 
N 
N 
What type of contract do you 
have? 
DD: Pay to fly (Pilot pays to 
accumulate hours)  Permanent contract 
(Contract length is unlimited); Zero 
hours contract (No or very little fixed 
income, pilot is paid per hour or sector 
flown, and typically engaged through 
an agency)  Fixed term contract (Same 
terms and conditions as a permanent 
contract, but contract duration is 
limited); Self-employed (Pilot is paid 
through a company established by 
them) ; Other 
7 DP7* N Do you work part-time or 
part-year in your current 
company?  
YES/NO 
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8 DP8* N (If yes to A08) What 
percentage of time do you 
work, on average?  
Only if Yes in Q7 
<25%, 25-50%, 51-75%, 76-90%, 91-
100%. 
9 DP9* N What is your job title? Captain, First Officer,  Second Officer 
10 DP10* N Do you have a management 
role in the company you fly 
for? 
Yes (flight operations); Yes (training 
manager); Yes (other) [text box]; No 
11 DP11* N How long have you been 
working in your company? 
<1yr, 1-4yrs, 5-10yrs, 11yrs+ 
12 DP12 
DP12_other 
N 
N 
You have worked less than 5 
years at your current 
company; -What kind of 
contract did you hold at your 
PREVIOUS employer? 
DD only to Pilots employed<5 yrs:  
Pay to fly (Pilot pays to accumulate 
hours)  Permanent contract (Contract 
length is unlimited); Zero hours 
contract (No or very little fixed income, 
pilot is paid per hour or sector flown, 
and typically engaged through an 
agency)  Fixed term contract (Same 
terms and conditions as a permanent 
contract, but contract duration is 
limited); Self-employed (Pilot is paid 
through a company established by 
them) ; Other (Please state) 
13 DP13 N Estimate your total block 
hours. 
DD: <300, 301-1000, 1001-3000, 3001-
5000, 5001-10000, 10000+ 
14 DP14 N Estimate your yearly income 
from your current employer 
(Airline) in Euro. 
DD: Negative (pay to fly), 0-10000, 
10001-30000, 30001-50000, 50001-
80000, 80001-110000, 110001-140000, 
140000+ 
15 DC1 N Have your company been 
wet/damp/dry leased to x1, 
x2, x3 or x4? (Names 
removed in this report) 
DD: Yes (unspecified), Yes (x1),Yes 
(x2), Yes (x3), Yes (4), No, Don't know 
Question deleted in report 
16 DC2 N Has your company 
implemented a Safety 
Management System (SMS)? 
Yes/No/Don't know 
17 DC3 N Do you consider the 
company's Safety 
Proactive, Reactive, Both Proactive and 
Reactive, equally so, Don't know 
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Management System mainly 
proactive or reactive? 
18  
DC4M 
DC4V 
DC4C 
 
N 
N 
N 
What kind of reporting 
system does your company 
have? 
Matrix: Yes/No/Don't Know 
Mandatory? 
Voluntary? 
Confidential? 
19 CAA1 N Is there a voluntary pilot 
reporting system in the 
country (CAA) where your 
company's AOC is 
registered? 
Yes/No/Don't know 
20 DC5 N Does the company have an 
agreement with the pilots 
(unions, collective 
agreements etc.) that 
safeguard an anonymous 
reporting environment? 
Yes (Union/collective agreement), 
Yes(no Union), No, Don't know 
21  
R1L 
R1B 
R1O 
R1T 
R1_other 
 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
In my opinion; -The main 
objectives of my company's 
reporting system is (pls 
prioritize): 
Prioritize:  
Learning,  
Put Blame,  
Fulfil obligation towards regulators, 
Trend Analysis,  
Other 
22  
 
Misc1SD 
Misc1CP 
Misc1CS 
Misc1M 
Misc1CAA 
Misc1NCP 
Misc1F 
 
 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
O 
How easy do you consider it 
to raise/discuss FLIGHT 
SAFETY concerns in public 
(Company, media, CAA, 
Friends): 
Single select matrix: Impossible, 
Difficult, Neutral, Easy, Very Easy 
Company Flight Safety department: 
Company Pilots: 
Company Staff (other than above): 
Media: 
CAA: 
Non-Company Pilots: 
Friends (Non-pilots): 
23  
 
R2M 
R2V 
R2C 
 
 
O 
O 
O 
My company encourages me 
to file reports? 
Single select matrix: Never, Rather not, 
I don't know, Please do, Always 
Mandatory reports: 
Voluntary reports: 
Company related reports: 
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24 R3 O My company always submits 
pilot reports, with a required 
authority reporting issue, to 
the authorities? 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
25 JC1 O The company's report 
investigation makes a clear 
distinction between a 
deliberate/gross violation and 
an unintentional 
error/mistake. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
26 Misc2 O I consider luck as a main 
safety factor in my 
company's daily operations? 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
27 JC2 O If there is NO reckless 
conduct, gross negligence or 
willful misconduct performed 
the organization and the 
pilots always have a sheared 
responsibility when a mishap 
occurs. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
28  
DC6L 
DC6PP 
DCHF 
DC_other 
 
O 
O 
O 
O 
 
In my company's safety 
organization I consider the 
main focus area towards 
flight safety performance to 
be: (pls prioritize) 
Prioritize:  
Latent/organizational errors 
Pilot Procedural Errors 
Human Factor Errors 
Other 
29 Misc3 O Pilot employment models do 
not affect flight safety. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
30 R4P O I would report more safety 
related issues if I had a 
permanent (unlimited) 
contract with my company? 
Only if not "Permanent Contract": 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
31 R4T O I would report more safety 
related issues if I had a 
Only if "Permanent Contract": Strongly 
disagree - Disagree - Neutral - Agree - 
Strongly Agree 
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temporary contract with my 
company? 
32  
 
 
 
Misc4SR 
Misc4FS 
Misc4MS 
Misc4SS 
 
 
 
 
O 
O 
O 
O 
You have changed employer 
the last 5 years; With your 
PREVIOUS employer, how 
would you rate the following 
criteria? 
Only for pilots with less than 5 years in 
company: Much Harder/less, 
Harder/less, No Change, Easier/more, 
Much easier/less 
Self-reporting 
Company flight safety focus 
Management support 
Social security situation 
33  
 
 
 
 
Misc5T 
Misc5P 
 
 
 
 
 
O 
O 
Employment models versus 
flight safety in Europe. 
Single select Matrix: Strongly reduce 
flight safety, Reduce flight safety, 
Neutral, Enhance Flight safety, 
Strongly enhance flight safety, No 
answer 
Temporary employment models: 
Permanent employment model: 
34 JC3* O Pilots who report safety-
related occurrences are 
treated in a just and fair 
manner. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
35 S1** O In my Company: Voicing 
concerns about safety is 
encouraged. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
36 S2** O In my Company: We get 
timely feedback on the safety 
issues we raise. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
37 S3* O I am prepared to speak to my 
direct manager when unsafe 
situations are developing. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
38 JC4 O If there is NO reckless 
conduct, gross negligence or 
willful misconduct 
performed, self-reporting 
would have NO 
consequences to my carrier.  
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
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39 S4* O Information about safety-
related changes within this 
company is clearly 
communicated to staff. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
40 S5* O We learn lessons from safety 
related incident or occurrence 
investigations. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
41 S6* O People in this company share 
safety related information. 
 
42 F1 O My company fully supports 
my decision if I step down 
from duty because of fatigue 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
43 JC5 O If I reported an error I am 
confident my company would 
treat me according to "just 
culture" principals, i.e. make 
a clear distinctions between 
human errors and "reckless 
conduct/ gross 
negligence/willful 
misconduct". 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
44 F2* O Pilots in this company are 
often tired at work. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
45 F3* O I would feel comfortable to 
complete a fatigue report. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
46 F4* O The issue of fatigue is taken 
seriously by this company. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
47 R5 O I always file a fatigue report 
when it is required by the 
authorities. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
48 R6 O Your previous answer 
indicates you don't always 
file fatigue reports when 
Drop down: 0, 1-3, 4-6, 7-10, 10+, No 
answer 
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required, approximately how 
often have you skipped a 
fatigue report the last 12 
months? 
49 F5 O Colleagues are sometimes 
fatigued to a level where 
flight safety is at risk. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
50 F6P O If I had a permanent 
(unlimited) employment 
contract it would be easier to 
step down from duty, when 
fatigued. 
Only if NOT "Permanent contract": 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
51 F6T O If I was employed through a 
temporary contract it would 
be harder to step down from 
duty, when fatigued. 
Only if "Permanent contract": Strongly 
disagree - Disagree - Neutral- Agree - 
Strongly Agree 
52 CAA2 O The national aviation safety 
authorities are politically 
governed to a degree that 
flight safety is jeopardized. 
Strongly disagree - Disagree - Neutral - 
Agree - Strongly Agree 
53 CAA3 N Please specify the country, or 
Europe (EASA), you was 
thinking of in the previous 
question. 
Drop down country + EASA 
54 Misc6 
 
N What is the greatest threat to 
aviation safety in Europe? 
Text box 
Text deleted in report, but 
categorized into 
Misc6_FirstThreat & 
Misc6_SecThreat 
55 Misc7 N Please feel free to comment 
on the issues of Flight Safety, 
Employment models, Just 
Culture, Reporting and 
Safety support: 
Text box 
Text deleted in report 
119 
 
2. Questback graphs, Mean, Standard deviation and results exported to SPSS 
The question containing company names and open ended questions were exported to SPSS, but they 
are deleted in the list below, because they infringed the clause of anonymity. 
1. What country are you based in? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
What country are you based in? 339 3.04 3.79 2.00 
  
 
 
2. What is your nationality? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
What is your nationality? 339 3.10 3.18 2.00 
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3. What is your age? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
What is your age? 339 2.96 1.02 3.00 
  
 
 
4. What type of company do you work for? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
What type of company do you work for? 339 1.65 1.38 1.00 
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5. What type of contract do you have? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
What type of contract do you have? 339 2.09 0.47 2.00 
  
 
 
6. Do you work part-time or part-year in your current company?  
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Do you work part-time or part-year in your current company?  339 1.81 0.39 2.00 
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7. What percentage of time do you work, on average?  
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
What percentage of time do you work, on average?  65 3.72 0.71 4.00 
  
 
 
8. What is your job title? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
What is your job title? 339 1.43 0.51 1.00 
  
 
0.0% 1.5%
38.5%
46.2%
13.8%
Less than 25 % 25-50% 51-75%  76-90%  91-100%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
t
57.5%
41.9%
0.6%
Captain First Offi cer Second Offi cer
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
t
   
 
 
9. Do you have a management role in the company (as specified in question 3) you fly for? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Do you have a management role in the company (as specified in question 3) 
you fly for? 
339 3.91 0.39 4.00 
  
 
 
10. How long have you been working in your current company? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
How long have you been working in your current company? 339 3.37 0.88 4.00 
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11. You have worked less than 5 years at your current company; -What kind of contract did you hold at 
your PREVIOUS employer? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
You have worked less than 5 years at your current company; -What kind of 
contract did you hold at your PREVIOUS employer? 
70 3.03 1.16 3.00 
  
 
 
12. Estimate your total block hours. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Estimate your total block hours. 338 5.08 1.22 6.00 
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13. Estimate your yearly income from your current employer (Airline) in Euro. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Estimate your yearly income from your current employer (Airline) in Euro. 336 6.13 1.24 6.00 
  
 
 
14. Has your company implemented a Safety Management System (SMS)? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Has your company implemented a Safety Management System (SMS)? 338 1.01 0.10 1.00 
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15. Do you consider the company's Safety Management System to be mainly proactive or reactive? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Do you consider the company's Safety Management System to be mainly 
proactive or reactive? 
294 2.19 0.90 3.00 
  
 
 
16. What kind of reporting system does your company have? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Mandatory reporting system 330 1.06 0.23 1.00 
Voluntary reporting system 329 1.04 0.19 1.00 
Confidential reporting system 333 1.06 0.23 1.00 
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17. Mandatory reporting system 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Mandatory reporting system 330 1.06 0.23 1.00 
  
 
 
18. Voluntary reporting system 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Voluntary reporting system 329 1.04 0.19 1.00 
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19. Confidential reporting system 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Confidential reporting system 333 1.06 0.23 1.00 
  
 
 
20. Is there a voluntary pilot reporting system in the country (CAA) where your company's AOC is 
registered? 
 
 
   AOC = Airline Operators Certificate 
   CAA = Civil Aviation Authorities  
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Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Is there a voluntary pilot reporting system in the country (CAA) where your 
company's AOC is registered? 
338 1.05 0.23 1.00 
  
 
 
21. Does the company have an agreement with the pilots (unions, collective agreements etc.) that 
safeguard a "just" reporting environment? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Does the company have an agreement with the pilots (unions, collective 
agreements etc.) that safeguard a "just" reporting environment? 
339 1.25 0.53 1.00 
  
 
 
22. In my opinion; -The main objectives of my company's reporting system is (pls prioritize): 
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Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Learning (Collective and individual learning) 317 1.63 0.90 1.00 
Put blame (Hold pilots accountable) 177 4.06 1.17 4.00 
Fulfill obligation towards regulators. 292 2.26 0.90 3.00 
Trend analysis 316 2.17 0.75 2.00 
Other 170 4.23 0.77 4.00 
  
 
 
23. Learning (Collective and individual learning) 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Learning (Collective and individual learning) 317 1.63 0.90 1.00 
  
 
 
24. Put blame (Hold pilots accountable) 
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Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Put blame (Hold pilots accountable) 177 4.06 1.17 4.00 
  
 
 
25. Fulfill obligation towards regulators. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Fulfill obligation towards regulators. 292 2.26 0.90 3.00 
  
 
 
26. Trend analysis 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Trend analysis 316 2.17 0.75 2.00 
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27. Other 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Other 170 4.23 0.77 4.00 
  
 
 
28. How easy do you consider it to raise/discuss FLIGHT SAFETY concerns in public (Company, media, 
CAA, Friends): 
 
 
   "Company" refer to the company you mainly fly for. 
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Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Company flight safety department 336 3.53 1.05 4.00 
Company Pilots 334 4.24 0.87 4.00 
Other company staff (except above) 335 3.35 0.94 3.00 
Media 334 2.10 0.88 2.00 
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) 334 2.80 0.93 3.00 
Non-company pilots 331 3.31 0.91 3.00 
Friends (non-pilots) 334 3.01 1.02 3.00 
  
 
 
29. Company flight safety department 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Company flight safety department 336 3.53 1.05 4.00 
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30. Company Pilots 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Company Pilots 334 4.24 0.87 4.00 
  
 
 
31. Other company staff (except above) 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Other company staff (except above) 335 3.35 0.94 3.00 
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32. Media 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Media 334 2.10 0.88 2.00 
  
 
 
33. Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) 334 2.80 0.93 3.00 
  
 
27.8%
39.5%
27.5%
4.5%
0.6%
Impossible Difficult Neutral Easy Very easy
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
t
8.4%
26.9%
44.0%
17.4%
3.3%
Impossible Difficult Neutral Easy Very easy
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
t
  
 
  
 
 
34. Non-company pilots 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Non-company pilots 331 3.31 0.91 3.00 
  
 
 
35. Friends (non-pilots) 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Friends (non-pilots) 334 3.01 1.02 3.00 
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36. My company encourages me to file reports about? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Mandatory flight safety issues 338 4.71 0.64 5.00 
Voluntary flight safety issues 337 4.25 0.85 4.00 
Company related issues 336 4.04 1.03 4.00 
  
 
 
37. Mandatory flight safety issues 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Mandatory flight safety issues 338 4.71 0.64 5.00 
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38. Voluntary flight safety issues 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Voluntary flight safety issues 337 4.25 0.85 4.00 
  
 
 
39. Company related issues 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Company related issues 336 4.04 1.03 4.00 
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40. My company always submits pilot reports, with a required authority reporting issue, to the 
authorities? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
My company always submits pilot reports, with a required authority reporting 
issue, to the authorities? 
337 4.01 1.00 4.00 
  
 
 
41. The company's report investigation team makes a clear distinction between a deliberate/gross 
violation and an unintentional error/mistake. 
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Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
The company's report investigation team makes a clear distinction between a 
deliberate/gross violation and an unintentional error/mistake. 
338 3.97 0.83 4.00 
  
 
 
42. I consider luck as a main safety factor in my company's daily operations? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
I consider luck as a main safety factor in my company's daily operations? 337 1.73 1.04 1.00 
  
 
 
43. If there is NO "reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct" performed the organization 
and the pilots always have a sheared responsibility when a mishap occur. 
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Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
If there is NO "reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct" 
performed the organization and the pilots always have a sheared responsibility 
when a mishap occur. 
337 3.53 0.91 4.00 
  
 
 
44. In my company’s safety organization I consider the main focus area towards flight safety 
performance to be: (pls prioritize) 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Latent/organizational errors 302 2.32 0.92 3.00 
Pilot Procedural errors 311 1.92 0.85 2.00 
Human factor errors 317 1.80 0.76 2.00 
Other 200 3.72 0.67 4.00 
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45. Latent/organizational errors 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Latent/organizational errors 302 2.32 0.92 3.00 
  
 
 
46. Pilot Procedural errors 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Pilot Procedural errors 311 1.92 0.85 2.00 
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47. Human factor errors 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Human factor errors 317 1.80 0.76 2.00 
  
 
 
48. Other 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Other 200 3.72 0.67 4.00 
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49. Pilot employment models do not affect flight safety. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Pilot employment models do not affect flight safety. 337 1.62 1.19 1.00 
  
 
 
50. I would report more safety related issues if I had a permanent (unlimited) contract with my 
company? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
I would report more safety related issues if I had a permanent (unlimited) 
contract with my company? 
18 3.94 1.35 4.50 
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51. I would report more safety related issues if I had a temporary contract with my company? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
I would report more safety related issues if I had a temporary contract with 
my company? 
319 1.65 0.98 1.00 
  
 
 
52. You have changed employer the last 5 years; with your PREVIOUS employer, how would you rate 
the following criteria? 
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Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Self-reporting 67 2.51 1.07 2.00 
Company Flight Safety Focus 66 2.55 1.03 2.50 
Management support 66 2.30 1.23 2.00 
My social security situation 66 2.44 1.38 2.00 
  
 
 
53. Self-reporting 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Self-reporting 67 2.51 1.07 2.00 
  
 
 
54. Company Flight Safety Focus 
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Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Company Flight Safety Focus 66 2.55 1.03 2.50 
  
 
 
55. Management support 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Management support 66 2.30 1.23 2.00 
  
 
 
56. My social security situation 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
My social security situation 66 2.44 1.38 2.00 
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57. Employment models versus flight safety in Europe. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Temporary Employment models 338 1.43 0.67 1.00 
Permanent Employment model (unlimited) 339 4.63 0.65 5.00 
  
 
 
58. Temporary Employment models 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Temporary Employment models 338 1.43 0.67 1.00 
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59. Permanent Employment model (unlimited) 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Permanent Employment model (unlimited) 339 4.63 0.65 5.00 
  
 
 
60. Pilots who report safety-related occurrences are treated in a just and fair manner by my company. 
 
 
   When answering the following questions, we presume there is NO "reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct" performed. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Pilots who report safety-related occurrences are treated in a just and fair 
manner by my company. 
339 4.13 0.86 4.00 
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61. In my company; voicing concerns about safety is encouraged. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
In my company; Voicing concerns about safety is encouraged. 337 3.96 0.92 4.00 
  
 
 
62. In my Company; we get timely feedback on the safety issues we raise. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
In my Company; We get timely feedback on the safety issues we raise. 339 3.53 0.98 4.00 
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63. I am prepared to speak to my direct manager when unsafe situations are developing. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
I am prepared to speak to my direct manager when unsafe situations are 
developing. 
339 4.09 0.92 4.00 
  
 
 
64. If there is NO "reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct performed", self-reporting 
errors would have NO consequences to my career.  
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
If there is NO "reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct 
performed", self-reporting errors would have NO consequences to my career.  
339 3.86 0.97 4.00 
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65. Information about safety-related changes within this company is clearly communicated to staff. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Information about safety-related changes within this company is clearly 
communicated to staff. 
335 3.79 0.90 4.00 
  
 
 
66. We learn lessons from safety related incident or occurrence investigations. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
We learn lessons from safety related incident or occurrence investigations. 335 4.06 0.73 4.00 
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67. People in this company share safety related information. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
People in this company share safety related information. 334 3.86 0.81 4.00 
  
 
 
68. My company fully supports my decision if I step down from duty because of fatigue. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
My company fully supports my decision if I step down from duty because of 
fatigue. 
336 3.74 1.03 4.00 
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69. If I reported an error I am confident my company would treat me according to "just culture" 
principles, i.e. make a clear distinctions between human errors and "reckless conduct/ gross 
negligence/willful misconduct". 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
If I reported an error I am confident my company would treat me according to "just 
culture" principles, i.e. make a clear distinctions between human errors and 
"reckless conduct/ gross negligence/willful misconduct". 
336 3.88 0.94 4.00 
  
 
 
70. Pilots in this company are often tired at work. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Pilots in this company are often tired at work. 338 3.78 0.92 4.00 
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71. I would feel comfortable to complete a fatigue report. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
I would feel comfortable to complete a fatigue report. 338 3.80 0.98 4.00 
  
 
 
72. The issue of fatigue is taken seriously by this company. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
The issue of fatigue is taken seriously by this company. 337 2.92 1.07 3.00 
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73. I always file a fatigue report when it is required by the authorities. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
I always file a fatigue report when it is  required by the authorities. 338 3.50 1.13 4.00 
  
 
 
74. Your previous answer indicates you don't always file fatigue reports when required, approximately 
how often have you skipped a fatigue report the last 12 months? 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Your previous answer indicates you don't always file fatigue reports when 
required, approximately how often have you skipped a fatigue report the last 12 
months? 
269 2.18 1.20 2.00 
  
 
5.3%
15.4%
22.8%
37.0%
19.5%
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
t
29.7%
44.6%
14.1%
4.1% 4.5% 3.0%
0 1-3 4-6 7-10 10+ No answer
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
t
  
 
  
 
 
75. Colleagues are sometimes fatigued to a level where flight safety is at risk. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean Standard deviation Median 
Colleagues are sometimes fatigued to a level where flight safety is at risk. 339 3.36 0.98 4.00 
  
 
 
76. If I had a permanent (unlimited) employment contract it would be easier to step down from duty, 
when fatigued. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
If I had a permanent (unlimited) employment contract it would be easier to step 
down from duty, when fatigued. 
19 3.89 0.85 4.00 
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77. If I was employed through a temporary contract it would be harder to step down from duty, when 
fatigued. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
If I was employed through a temporary contract it would be harder to step 
down from duty, when fatigued. 
320 4.57 0.73 5.00 
  
 
 
78. The national aviation safety authorities (CAA/EASA) are politically governed to a degree that flight 
safety is jeopardized. 
 
 
   CAA = Civil Aviation Authorities 
   EASA = European Aviation Safety Agency 
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Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
The national aviation safety authorities (CAA/EASA) are politically governed to 
a degree that flight safety is jeopardized. 
338 4.06 1.03 4.00 
  
 
 
79. Please specify the country, or Europe (EASA), you were thinking of in the previous question. 
 
 
 
 
Question N Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median 
Please specify the country, or Europe (EASA),  you were thinking of in the 
previous question. 
327 5.11 5.37 4.00 
  
 
 
 
3. Mail to OSM Aviation: 
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